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THE HIDDEN FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES OF
PRIVACY
Sean M. Scott*
Abstract: The private facts tort protects the privacy of individuals by punishing the
publication of private information. The First Amendment protects the press when it publishes
information in which the public has a legitimate interest. The right to keep information private
and the right to publish information sometimes conflict. The First Amendment is often the
victor in these conflicts; courts are concerned that the private facts tort threatens First
Amendment values. This Article challenges the argument that punishing a media defendant
for publishing truthful information will threaten unduly First Amendment values. The Article
argues instead that the private facts tort promotes, not undermines, First Amendment values.
The Article suggests a reallocation of the burdens of proof in private facts tort cases and
demonstrates that this reallocation will revitalize the tort while not threatening First
Amendment interests.
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The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy
In a society in which multiple, often conflicting role performances
are demanded of each individual, the original etymological
meaning of the word "'person "-mask-has taken on new meaning.
Men fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much of the
outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a reaction to
exposure to persons known only through business or other
secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total
secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle of intimacy-to
choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask. Loss of control
over which 'face" one puts on may result in literal loss of self-
identity, and is humiliating beneath the gaze of those whose
curiosity treats a human being as an object.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 1995, retired general Colin Powell held a news
conference during which he announced that he would not run for the
Presidency of the United States in 1996.2 Prior to that conference, The
Philadelphia Inquirer and Newsweek both published stories stating that
Alma Powell, Colin Powell's wife, was taking medication for
depression.' When asked about the stories, General Powell was not
critical of the press.4 However, an editorial that appeared in The New
York Times was more critical of the publication of the information. The
author wrote:
The story [about Mrs. Powell] ... was not news, not pertinent and
not our business.
Mrs. Powell was not considering running for office. Her medical
history does not belong to the public unless she chooses to
announce it.
If the editors' rationalization was that his wife's problem might
influence Mr. Powell's decision, it would be a story only if she
1. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
2. The Powell Decision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1995, at B13; Excerpts from Colin L. Powell's News
Conference, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1995, at A14.
3. Eleanor Clift et al., Why the General's Wife Is a Reluctant Warrior, Newsweek, Nov. 6, 1995,
at 39, 39; Dick Polman & Steve Goldstein, Powell Looks More Like a Candidate, Phila. Inquirer, Oct.
22, 1995, at Al.
4. See Excerpts from Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2, at A14.
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were refusing to take medication that helps her give sensible advice
to her husband....
Finally-for emphasis-it is an invasion of privacy. The press has
to do that every day. But ... journalists that regard their role as
responsible ... have the moral and journalistic right to violate
privacy only when necessary to make a significant news point.. .. '
This editorial and the disclosure of information about Alma Powell
raise anew the tension between the protection of private information and
the freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment.6 The
disclosure and publicizing of private information can form the basis of a
tort cause of action for invasion of privacy.7 When a cause of action
based on this "private facts" tort is brought, courts are sometimes faced
with the issue of how best to balance the right of privacy against the First
Amendment.! Although courts at one time seemed receptive to the
private facts tort, it has been eroded steadily under the onslaught of First
Amendment jurisprudence.9 The Supreme Court's most recent balancing
of these two interests has resulted in a substantial undermining of the
private facts tort.'
5. A.M. Rosenthal, Two Enemies of the Press, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,1995, at A25.
6. U.S. Const., amend. I.
7. The private facts tort has been identified by Prosser as one of four torts that come under the
invasion of privacy umbrella. Prosser's four distinct torts are: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts about the
plaintiff [the private facts tort]; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. William
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
8. Some legal commentators contest the validity and need for the private falcis tort. They would
eliminate the need to balance by eliminating the private facts tort altogether. See Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeia Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326 (1966);
Don R. Pember, Privacy and the Press: The Law The Mass Media, and the First Amendment 238
(1972); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393 (1978); Diane L. Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 Comell L. Rev.
291, 300-01 (1983).
Some courts have agreed with the commentators and eliminated the tort or have severely limited
the recovery to which a plaintiff may be entitled. See Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d
803 (Or. 1986); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Freihofer v. Hearst Coip., 480 N.E.2d 349
(N.Y. 1985). As there remain at least 35 otherjurisdictions that recognize the tort, the effort to figure
out the appropriate balance between the tort and the First Amendment remains a valid enterprise. See
Libel Defense Resource Center, LDRC 50-State Survey, 1994-95 (Henry R. Kaufinan ed., 1994).
9. For a detailed history of the development of the law of privacy see Pember, supra note 8.
10. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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In preempting the private facts tort, courts are concerned about
protecting First Amendment values." The conflict between these two
rights is often construed as the individual's right to be let alone versus
the public's need for information. 2 This construction of the conflict is
too simple. The conflict that arises between the right of privacy and the
First Amendment freedom of the press may not be one of the individual
against society. The private facts tort does protect an individual's interest
in personhood or human dignity, 3 it also promotes some of the same
values protected by the First Amendment. 4 Thus, allowing the private
facts tort to preempt the right of freedom of the press will not always
result in the undermining of First Amendment values-it may even
promote them.
Current approaches to resolving the conflict between the private facts
tort and the First Amendment fail to appreciate the First Amendment
values of privacy. This article investigates whether changing the
elements of the plaintiffs prima facie case for the private facts tort,
combined with a change in the doctrine of newsworthiness, might cause
courts to consider more seriously the interests protected by privacy
without undermining the First Amendment.
Specifically, this article proposes a model in which the burden of
proving newsworthiness in an action based on the private facts tort
would shift from the plaintiff to the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff would
not have to prove that the information disclosed lacked legitimate public
interest. Instead, the media defendant seeking First Amendment
protection would have the burden of proving the newsworthiness of the
information disclosed. Additionally, a nexus requirement would be added
to the newsworthiness test. This requirement would demand that the
defendant establish that the information disclosed substantially related to
a matter of legitimate public interest. The defendant also would be
required to show that the information was obtained lawfully. Finally, a
plaintiff could rebut the showing of newsworthiness by establishing that
the restriction on publicizing the information was necessary to further a
compelling state interest.
11. These values include truth, autonomy and self-governance.
12. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976);
Afro-Am. Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253
P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953).
13. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964).
14. That the private facts tort promotes the same values as does the First Amendment is the focus
of the discussion in part III of this Article, infra.
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Part II of this article reviews existing methods used by courts to
balance the protection of private information against the freedom of the
press. Part III investigates the impact the proposed approach would have
on First Amendment values. Finally, part IV applies this proposed
approach to the disclosure of confidential medical information (using
Mrs. Powell's situation as an example).
II. THE EXISTING APPROACHES TO BALANCING THE RIGHT
TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AGAINST FIRST
AMENDMENT VALUES
A. Development of the Private Facts Tort
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are generally recognized as the
fathers of the tort of invasion of privacy. In a 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, the two articulated the need for a remedy against an overzealous
and unrestrained press.'5 The authors argued that man has a "right 'to be
let alone.""..6 This "right to be let alone" went beyond the scope of
defamation. The right to privacy was included in this light to be let
alone. 7 This right included the right to be free of the disclosure of true
private information, where disclosure would cause unwarranted damage
to a person, inflicting needless mental and emotional distress.'
According to the authors, certain facts about a person's "private life,
habits, acts, and relations" belonged to the individual and the publication
of those facts should be actionable. 9
Initially the judiciary was reluctant to recognize the privacy cause of
action.20 However, in the landmark case of Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co.,2 the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a type of privacy tort.
Pavesich involved the common law right to privacy for the commercial
exploitation of a person's name to advertise a commercial product. It was
not until 1927, in the case of Brents v. Morgan,22 that a court recognized
a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on the disemination of
15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
16. Id. at 195 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 29 (2d ed., Chicago:
Callaghan, 1888).
17. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421,437 n.48 (1980).
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 213.
19. Id. at216.
20. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 117, at 850 (5th ed. 1984).
21. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
22. 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927).
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private information. Gradually, the common law grew to recognize the
tort of invasion of privacy and in 1934, the First Restatement of Torts
included it as a harm to be remedied under the common law of torts.23
Several states soon went beyond the common law and enacted statutes
securing a right to privacy.24 Other states have gone further and added a
right to privacy to their state constitutions.' Today, thirty-five states
recognize the private facts tort, either through common law or by
statute.26 The Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the most common
elements of the tort: (1) public disclosure; (2) of private facts; (3)
concerning a matter which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (4) which is not of legitimate concern to the public.27
1. Public Disclosure
As provided in the Second Restatement of Torts, "[P]ublicity ...
means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public
at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge., 2' Disclosure
by the mass media satisfies the requirement of publicity.
23. The First Restatement of Torts, section 867, provided that, "A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Restatement (First) of Torts § 867 (1934). The Second
Restatement of Torts, section 652D provides that, "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the mater
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
24. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20.201 (1995); N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1995); Okla. Stat.
tit. 21 §§ 839.1-839.3 (West 1996); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401 to 76-9-406 (1995); Va. Code
§§ 2.1-377 to 2.1-386 (Michie 1995); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50 (West 1995).
25. Alaska Const. art. 1, § 22; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § I; Fla. Const. art. I,
§ 23; Haw. Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art I, § 6; La. Const. art. 1, § 5; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10; Wash.
Const. art. I, § 7.
26. Libel Defense Resource Center, supra note 8 (citing and discussing each state's law).
27. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D (1977); see also Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc.,
870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D.
Pa. 1992); Times Mirror v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S.
1094 (1989); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
28. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D cmt. a (1977).
Washington Law Review Vol. 71:683, 1996
2. Private Facts
There is no definitive test for "private facts."29 At the very least,
information published must not be a matter of public record or open to
public inspection.30  For instance, no liability has been found for
31 32 3publicizing criminal arrests, criminal convictions, or bankruptcy.
Similarly, there is generally no liability for publicizing matters that were
in plain view or occurred in a public place as these matters are not
considered private.34 Thus, no liability was found for publicizing an
arrest made in a public place,35 using a photograph taken daring a combat
mission in Vietnam,36 or depicting plaintiff at a public athletic event.37
On the other hand, information concerning sexual matters or procreation
generally has been held to be private.38
29. The issue has arisen as to whether facts are no longer private when the plaintiff has disclosed
the information to a limited number of people, such as family members or close friends. Generally,
courts have found that the information remains private when such a limited disclosure is made.
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Times
Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 561; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983);
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443
S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); YG., 795 S.W.2d 488; Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988);
Butsee Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985), ifJ'd, 799 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S 1088 (1987).
30. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953); Rawlins v. Hutchinson
Publishing Co., 543 P.2d. 988, 993 (Kan. 1975); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing. Co., 368 P.2d 147
(N.M. 1962).
31. Smith v. NBC, 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Reece v. Grissom, 267 S.E.2d 839
(Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
32. Cox Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App.), cer. denied, 474 U.S.
982 (1985); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert.
denied, 508 A.2d 488 (Md.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986). But see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
33. Hendry v. Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921 (Minn'. 1975). See generally David A. Elder, The Law of
Privacy § 3:3 (1991).
34. Gill, 253 P.2d at 444; Floyd v. Park Cities People, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
35. Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
36. Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.C.N.J. 1986).
37. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Elder, supra note 33,
§ 3:4.
38. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Diaz 1. Oakland Tribune,
Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Hawkins v. Multimedia, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 145 (S.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986).
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3. Offensive Disclosure
As with the definition of "private facts" the issue of what constitutes
offensive facts depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The plaintiff must establish that a "reasonable person would feel
justifiably and seriously aggrieved by widespread disclosure."39
However, the tort is not designed to protect the disclosure of all
information that by its nature is private; as Prosser himself stated, "The
law of privacy is not intended for the protection of any shrinking soul
who is abnormally sensitive about such publicity."4
4. Matter of Legitimate Public Concern
This final element, that the matter disclosed not be one of legitimate
public concern, relates to the "newsworthiness" of the disclosed facts.
Any information that is likely to garner public attention may be deemed
newsworthy. This requirement will be discussd in greater detail in part
II.B.2.
B. Constitutional Defenses to the Private Facts Tort
When an individual accuses a member of the mass media of invading
her privacy by disclosing private information about her, the mass media
defendant often responds by arguing that the disclosure is protected by
the First Amendment. Hence, the claims of an individual against public
39. Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment:
Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 193 (1979); see Samuel v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 328-29 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Davis v. Gen. Fin. & Thrift Corp., 57 S.E.2d 225 (Ga. Ct. App.
1950); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div., 472 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Meetze v.
Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (S.C. 1956); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944); This
element does not require that the information publicized reach the level of repulsiveness or horror:
Even people who have nothing rationally to be ashamed of can be mortified by the publication
of intimate details of their life. Most people in no wise deformed or disfigured would
nevertheless be deeply upset if nude photographs of themselves were published in a newspaper
or book. They feel the same way about photographs of their sexual activities, however,
"normal," or about a narrative of those activities, or about having their medical records
publicized. Although it is well known that every human being defecates, no adult human being
in our society wants a newspaper to show a picture of him defecating.
Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993).
40. Prosser, supra note 7, at 397; see also Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal.
1953); Davis, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
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disclosure of private information are met with the society's interest in
freedom of the press.4'
Current approaches to balancing the values protected by the private
facts tort against the First Amendment include the "lawfully obtained"
doctrine and the "newsworthiness" doctrine. Although newsworthiness is
a common law doctrine, the judiciary has treated the doctrine as though it
is of constitutional magnitude. 2 It is designed to protect First
Amendment values. Neither of these approaches consistently and
adequately protects the privacy interests at stake.
1. The Lawfully Obtained Doctrine
Four cases have come before the Supreme Court in which plaintiffs
have claimed the violation of their rights to avoid disclosure of assertedly
confidential information by the press.43 The Court has held in each case
that the First Amendment preempts the plaintiff's right of recovery. It
was not until its decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.' that the
Court articulated a principle for balancing informational privacy interests
against the First Amendment. This principle is known as the "lawfully
41. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated:
This complex, important case ... requires us to decide the precise issue of resolving the delicate
balance between a married couple's right to their privacy ... and the freedom of the electronic
news media to report and make public the events surrounding the modem medical "miracle" of
the extraordinary process in vitro fertilization. The issue is certainly not easily resolved for the
cherished freedoms embodied in the American ideal of privacy of the individual and the
freedom of the news media necessarily conflict.
Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also David O'Brien, Privacy,
Law and Public Policy 144 (1979).
42. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 935
(1989); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (" W]e are satisfied that this provision
[newsworthiness] is one of constitutional dimensicn delimiting the scope of the tort and that the extent of
the privilege thus is controlled by federal rather than state law."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976);
Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987).
43. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In addition to the four cases discussed, another case is worth mentioning
here. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy based on
the false light tort. The tort of invasion of privacy through the disclosure of private facts was not at
issue; however, the Court indicated in a footnote that there might be tort liability for unwarranted
publicity of the truth. In note 7 of its opinion, the Court stated that "[r]evelations may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the cormunity's notion of
decency." Id. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
44. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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obtained doctrine." This doctrine is emerging as the principle the Court
will apply to balance the protection of private information against the
freedom of the press. This doctrine provides that publicizing private
information is constitutionally protected if three factors are met: (1) the
information publicized was lawfully obtained; (2) the information
concerns a matter of public significance; and (3) the imposition of
liability does not serve a compelling state interest.4'
The first case decided by the Court in this area was Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn.46 Cox involved a constitutional challenge to a Georgia
statute that made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or
identity of any rape victim.47 A television reporter obtained the name of a
rape and murder victim from official court records open to the public."
The reporter identified the deceased by name while reporting on the trial
of the accused rapists. 9 When the father of the deceased sued for
violation of the Georgia statute, the defendants raised the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as their defense. The Supreme Court found
that "[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open
to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it."',
The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments barred the
State of Georgia from penalizing the defendants for the broadcast. 2
Two years after Cox came Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court.3 At issue in Oklahoma Publishing was the constitutionality of a
pretrial order entered by the District Court of Oklahoma County
enjoining members of the news media from publishing the name or
picture of a minor child involved in a juvenile proceeding. 4 The child in
question was charged with second-degree murder." Members of the
news media were present at the detention hearing, and were present with
45. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103-04.
46. 420 U.S. 469.
47. Id. at 472.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 496.
52. Id. at 497. For a critique of this decision see Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the
First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1264-68 (1976).
53. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
54. Id. at 310.
55. Id. at 309.
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the full knowledge of the judge.56 The court did not at ar.y time object to
the presence of the news media."
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 It reasoned that pursuant to Cox, the
court could not prohibit the dissemination of informalion obtained at
court proceedings that were open to the public. 9 Here, as in Cox, the
name of the juvenile was "publicly revealed in connection with the
prosecution of the crime"6 and thus "was placed in the pubic domain."61
Two years after the Oklahoma Publishing decision, the Court decided
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing.6" Smith involved a constitutional
challenge to a West Virginia statute that made it a crime for a newspaper
to publish, without prior approval of the juvenile court, the name of a
youth charged as a juvenile offender. 3 The newspaper published the
name of a juvenile charged with murder and information it had obtained
from witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney present
at the scene.64
The Court reversed the conviction of the newspaper for violating the
statute, holding that the statute violated the First Amendment.65 In
reaching this decision, the Court articulated for the first time a First
Amendment principle to use in balancing the rights of informational
privacy and the First Amendment.6 The Court stated that "if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order., 67 The interest in protecting the identity of a juvenile
offender did not satisfy this standard. 8
56. Id. at 311.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 311-12.
59. Id. at311.
60. Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975)).
61. Id.
62. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 105-06.
66. Id. at 100.
67. Id. at 103.
68. Id. at 104.
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Florida Star v. B.J.F.69 is the most recent case in which the Supreme
Court has been called on to balance the interests of privacy against the
First Amendment. The Court employed the lawfully obtained doctrine
articulated in Smith to invalidate a Florida statute prohibiting the
disclosure of the name of a rape victim.70 B.J.F. was raped at knifepoint
in Jacksonville, Florida.7 She reported the rape to the sheriffs office,
which prepared a report.72 The sheriffs department inadvertently
included B.J.F.'s name in the report and placed the report in its
pressroom. 73 A reporter for the Florida Star newspaper obtained the
victim's name from the police report and the newspaper published the
report including B.J.F.'s full name.74
B.J.F. sued the sheriffs department and the newspaper, alleging that
the disclosure violated a Florida statute that prohibited the publication by
the mass media of the name of any sexual offense victims.75 The Florida
courts agreed with B.J.F. and imposed civil damages on the newspaper.76
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such an imposition of
damages for publishing the name of a rape victim violated the First
Amendment when the information was lawfully obtained from a police
report.7
7
Soon after the Florida Star case legal commentators suggested that the
Court's decision foreclosed the possibility of privacy interests ever
outweighing the First Amendment. 8 Indeed, Justice White in dissent
stated that the Court had accepted Florida Star's "invitation ... to
obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th
century: the tort of the publication of private facts.... Even if the
Court's opinion does not say as much today, such obliteration will follow
inevitably from the Court's conclusion here. 79 Despite Justice White's
69. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
70. Id. at 541.




75. Fla Stat. ch. 794.03 (1987).
76. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 Tex. L.
Rev. 1195 (1990); Jacqueline R. Rolfs, Note, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End
for the Tort of Public Disclosure, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1107; Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts
Tort: The End is Here, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 299 (1991).
79. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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dire prediction, the Court itself stated in Florida Star that it declined to
hold that privacy interests must always fall in the thce of a First
Amendment challenge."0 Seven years have passed since Florida Star was
decided, and the fate of the private facts tort remains unclear.8'
The lawfully obtained doctrine generally has been [ound to apply
when the information publicized is already a matter of public record, part
of an official document, or in some other way has been made public. 2
When courts have been confronted with a direct conflict between the
common law private facts tort and the First Amendment, and the
information has not been made public, some courts have continued to use
the newsworthiness doctrine to resolve the conflict rather than the
lawfully obtained doctrine. 3 These courts do not consider whether the
information was obtained lawfully or whether the state law restriction is
necessary to further a compelling state interest. Other courts have
adopted the lawfully obtained doctrine to resolve the conflict.8 4
In Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 5 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages from a
newspaper for an invasion of privacy based on its publication of her
80. See id. at 532.
81. The statute under which the plaintiff in Florida Star brought suit has been held
unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court- State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d
110 (Fla. 1994).
82. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (7th Cir. 1993). The Haynes court
stated:
We do not think the Court was being coy in Cox or Florida Star in declining to declare the tort
of publicizing intensely personal facts totally defunct. (Indeed, the author cf Cox dissented in
Florida Star.) The publication of facts in a public record or other official document, such as the
police report in the Florida Star, is not to be equated to publishing a photo of a couple making
love or of a person undergoing some intimate medical procedure; we even doubt that it would
make a difference in such a case if the photograph had been printed in a government
document ....
Id. at 1332; see also Heath v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fla. 1990); cf Doe v.
Board. of Regents, 452 S.E.2d 776, 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Near East Side Community Org. v.
Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994).
83. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232; Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994),
appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1994); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Anonsen, 857 S.W.2d 700.
84. Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Heath, 732 F. Supp. 1145; Macon
Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993); Doe v. Star Telegram, Inc., 864 S.W.2d
790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995); cf Cape Publications, Inc. v.
Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989), appeal dismissed, 493 U.S. 929 (1989).
85. 436 S.E.2d 655.
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name in connection with a sexual assault.86 Plaintiff based her claim
against the newspaper on violation of the private facts tort. The plaintiff
had shot and killed an attacker as he attempted to rape her. The police
who investigated the shooting disclosed the plaintiff's name to reporters
for the defendant newspaper, but admonished them not to publish it. 7
Defendant published her name and the street where she lived despite the
admonition.88
In deciding the case, the court found that the decision in Florida Star
was not controlling. The plaintiff did not base her cause of action on the
common law tort and the state had imposed liability on the media
defendant based on a negligence per se standard.89 The court also
construed the holding in Florida Star quite narrowly: "The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the First Amendment prohibits imposing damages on
a newspaper that publishes the name of a rape victim obtained from a
police report." 90 Though it did not find the decision controlling, the
Georgia court adopted the lawfully obtained test applied in Florida Star
and disallowed plaintiff's recovery. 9'
The court in Doe v. Star Telegram92 also adopted the Florida Star test.
The plaintiff in Star Telegram had been raped. She reported the rape to
the police, who prepared and filed a report of the assault.94 A reporter for
the defendant newspaper obtained a copy of the report and the newspaper
subsequently published two separate articles about the rape. Although
the newspaper did not publish the plaintiffs name, the articles did
include a substantial amount of personal information about the plaintiff.96
The plaintiff sued claiming invasion of privacy. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Texas Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial.97 On remand the
appellate court found that the appropriate test to determine the






92. 864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).




97. Id. at 792-93.
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defendant's liability was the Florida Star test.98 The majority found that
Florida Star was controlling because it "involved a conflict between
truthful reporting and state-protected privacy interests, the exact issue
presented here." 99 The concurring opinion would have decided the case
under the newsworthiness doctrine.,"'o
Despite the inclination of courts to construe Florida 5tar narrowly''
and limit its application to information that was already public, it is
impossible to ignore that Florida Star drastically undermines the tort of
public disclosure. 2 It does so in two primary ways: First, it prohibits
restrictions on the publication of information that was lawfully obtained;
second, it requires a showing that restricting publication is
"overwhelmingly necessary" to advance the state's interest."0 3 The Court
essentially has increased the plaintiff's burden in privacy cases. Not only
must the plaintiff show that the information published is not newsworthy,
the plaintiff must also show that the restriction on publication satisfies a
compelling state interest.
A further concern is whether the lawfully obtained element of the
Florida Star test will swallow the remaining two elements. The Court in
Florida Star identified three factors to be used to determine if the
disclosure is privileged by the First Amendment." 4 The Court spent
much of its opinion discussing whether the informa.tion had been
obtained lawfully. In its concluding paragraph the Court stated in
98. Id. at 792.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 793 (Hicks, J., concurring). It is not clear from the concurrence whether consideration
would have been given to the issues of whether the information was lawfully obtained and whether
the restriction served a compelling state interest. The concurring judge does state, "While I concur
with the majority as to the result, I would offer a different analysis." Id. The concurrence then goes
on to suggest that there was an issue of fact as to whether the information disclosed was a matter of
legitimate public concern. Id.
101. See Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Tatun, 436 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. 1993); In re Minor, 595
N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ill. 1992).
102. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). The court stated:
Yet despite the limited scope of the holdings of Cox and Florida Star, the implications of those
decisions for the branch of the right of privacy that limits the publication of private facts are
profound, even for a case such as this in which, unlike Melvin v. Reid, the primary source of the
allegedly humiliating personal facts is not a public record.
Id.
103. Rolfs, supra note 78, at 1115-17.
104. The factors are those identified by the Court in Smith v. Daily Mail Publirhing Co.: (1) whether
the information publicized was lawfully obtained; (2) whether the information concerns a matter of public
significance; and (3) whether the imposition of liablity serves a compelling state interest. 443 U.S. 97,
103-04(1979).
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summary fashion the test it had applied: "We hold only that where a
newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.. . ."' This emphasis on
the manner in which the information was obtained is some indication of
the importance the Court placed on this element of the test. If courts
allow the lawfully obtained element to swallow the other two elements of
the Florida Star test" 6 then the forecasters were right; the tort of public
disclosure will be eviscerated." 7 It will not matter whether the
information is private, and not a matter of public record. As long as the
media defendant can establish that it received the information lawfully,
then its publication will not violate the right to privacy.'O0
2. Newsworthiness
a. Scope
The Court in Florida Star seems to have subsumed the
newsworthiness test into the lawfully obtained doctrine. Newsworthiness
as a limitation on the private facts tort appears in the seminal article on
privacy authored by Warren and Brandeis. 9 The right to keep certain
information private was not unlimited. The authors noted that the right of
privacy would not prohibit "any publication of matter which is of public
or general interest.""'  This concept has evolved into the doctrine of
newsworthiness. In its current formulation, the doctrine of
newsworthiness encompasses two distinct concepts: (1) the press may
make fair comment regarding public figures,"' and (2) the press may
make fair comment on that which is of legitimate public interest." 2 The
scope of the doctrine is quite broad; as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
105. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,541 (1989).
106. It is too early yet to determine whether this will be the case. There is not enough case law to
discern a trend.
107. For a detailed analysis and critique of the lawfiully obtained doctrine, see Edelman, supra
note 78.
108. See Rolfs, supra note 78.
109. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15.
110. Id. at214.
111. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977).
112. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1129; Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. c (1977); Woito & MeNulty, supra note 39, at 194.
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The risk of... exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.
"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which in.ormation is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of soc:.ety to cope
with the exigencies of their period."' 
13
Courts exhibit great deference to the news media in determining what
shall constitute newsworthiness." 4 They are reluctant to restrict or define
newsworthiness, deferring instead to the press." 5 One commentator
suggests that this reluctance is based on the unwillingness of the
judiciary to define "news"' ' and on the fear that "the press will become a
self-censor in order to avoid imposition of liability and thereby be chilled
in the exercise of its first amendment rights.""' 7 Essentially, if an item
has been printed it is deemed newsworthy by the courts."8 Thus, the
media, rather than the court, becomes the ultimate arbiter of what is
newsworthy. Given this amount of deference by the court, claims based
on violation of the private facts tort almost always fall in the face of this
defense.' As this element of the Florida Star test has so little weight as
113. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940)).
114. Courts often acknowledge this deference to the press. In Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d
92 (App. Div. 1970), the court stated that the definition of newsworthiness is "necessarily circular
because an action for invasion of privacy arises only after some publication has made the plaintiff a
subject of public concern." Id. at 94. Similarly, the court in Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co.,
712 P.2d 803, 809 (Or. 1986), stated that "one reader's or viewer's 'news' is another's tedium or
trivia." Id.; see also Heath v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 11.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[W]hat is newsworthy is primarily a function of the publisher, not the courts.").
115. See Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 195.
116. See Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921
(1958).
117. Kelly v. Post Publishing Co., 98 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1951); Woito & McNulty, supra note
39, at 195.
118. Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 197. See Kalven, supra note 8; Peter N. Swan, Publicity
Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties with a Developing Tort, 58 Or. L.
Rev. 483, 502 (1980); Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 343.
119. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile," 64
Iowa L. Rev. 1111, 1133-34 (1979); Hill, supra note 52, at 1255. As one court has stated:
[T]he interest of the public in the free dissemination of the truth and unimpeded access to news
is so broad, so difficult to define and so dangerous to circumscribe that courts have been
reluctant to make such factually accurate public disclosures tortious, except where the lack of
any meritorious pubic interest in the disclosure is very clear and its offensiveness to ordinary
sensibilities is equally clear.
Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 450.
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currently construed, it is almost certain that the lawfully obtained
element will become key.
b. Burden of Proof
There is a limited debate over which party in a private facts tort action
should bear the burden of proving newsworthiness. 20 Prosser placed the
burden of newsworthiness on the defendant. The Second Restatement of
Torts, however, places the burden on the plaintiff to show that the
information is not of legitimate public concern.' Many jurisdictions
usually require that the plaintiff prove that the matter is not one of
legitimate public concern.' For instance, in Howard v. Des Moines
Register & Tribune 23 the court stated clearly that "it is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove the lack of newsworthiness of the disclosure as well as
its invasiveness. Newsworthiness is thus not an issue of privilege which
must be urged defensively but an element which must be negated by the
plaintiff in meeting her burden of proof."' 24 Similarly, California follows
the Restatement and requires the plaintiff to establish that the information
does not involve a matter of legitimate public concern. In Diaz v.
Oakland Tribune, 25 the California Court of Appeals reversed a trial court
There are a few cases in which the court has held that the published matter was not of legitimate
public interest. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285 (Ct. App. 1931); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942); Y.G. v. Jewish
Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d
473,482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 1985).
120. The terms "newsworthiness" and "matters of legitimate public concern" are often used
interchangeably by courts and commentators. See Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d
874, 875 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1994); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d
711, 714 (N.C. 1988); Anonsen v. Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2135 (1994). These terms have become all but indistinguishable and will be used
interchangeably in this article.
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977).
122. McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 929
(1989); Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1412 (C.D. III. 1992); White v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Cape Publications,
Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 493 U.S. 929 (1989); Howard, 283
N.W.2d 289. But cf. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Mason
v. Williams Discount Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing between
proving that matter is not one of public concern and newsworthiness privilege and finding that
privilege is affirmative defense and plaintiffdoes not have to show privilege in order to state claim.).
123. 283 N.W.2d 289.
124. Id. at 300.
125. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
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opinion that held that the defendant in a private facts suit had the burden
of proving newsworthiness.
2 6
There are two problems with allocating the burden of disproving
newsworthiness to the plaintiff. First, placing the burden of proof on the
plaintiff essentially requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has
no First Amendment defense to the disclosure. This allocation of proof
seems inconsistent with the general approach to claims of constitutional
privilege. Generally, if a defendant claims that his actions. are protected
by constitutional privilege, the burden is his to establish that privilege or
defense. It is not the plaintiff's initial burden to establish that the law is
constitutional or that the defendant's actions are not constitutionally
privileged. This is so in the areas of commercial speech and obscenity. If
an action is brought against a defendant based on the violation of a state
statute regulating commercial or obscene speech, it is the defendant's
burden to raise the First Amendment defense.'27
Second, requiring the plaintiff to establish the non-newsworthiness of
the disclosure forces the plaintiff to make an argument based only on one
First Amendment value. She must argue that nondisclosure does not
violate the First Amendment value of making information available to
the public. She is limited to arguing that nondisclosure will not harm the
First Amendment. But what of her arguments that noncisclosure will
promote First Amendment values? If the plaintiff is unable to show that
the information is nonewsworthy, then she will never have the
opportunity to argue that nondisclosure may promot-e other First
Amendment values. She cannot show that nondisclosure may promote
the search for truth, or self-governance or autonomy. This is especially
true as often a plaintiffs complaint is met with a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment.' Shifting the burden to the defendant at
least grants the plaintiff an opportunity to make her case based on the
promotion of a wide range of First Amendment values.
126. Id.; see Swan, supra note 118, at 505.
127. If the plaintiff is seeking to enjoin the dissemination of allegedly obscene speech then it has
the burden of proving that it is unprotected. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, .38-59 (1965).
128. Some courts have found that in matters involving First Amendment rights, summary
judgment is a favored remedy "because unnecessarily protracted litigation woald have a chilling
effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and because speedy resolution of cases involving
free speech is desirable." Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987);
Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 676 (Ct. App. 1986); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201
Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir.
1993); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 522
(Mich. 1994); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Doe v. Star Telegram,
Inc., 864 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 915 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
Vol. 71:683, 1996
The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy
III. THE NEW TEST AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Proposed Reformulation
The proposed reformulation is premised on judicial acceptance of the
three prong test employed in Florida Star. First, the reformulation would
require the defendant to prove that the information had been obtained
lawfully.'29 Second, it would shift the burden regarding the element of
newsworthiness 3 ' from the plaintiff to the defendant. Third, it would
adopt two of the three factors used by California courts to determine
newsworthiness and add another. The factors used by California courts in
assessing newsworthiness are: (1) the social value of the facts
published;'.. (2) the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private
affairs;' and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to
position of public notoriety. 3 3 The added factor would require the
defendant to show that disclosure of all of the information, including the
identification of the plaintiff, was related substantially to a matter of
legitimate public concern. 34 Finally, the plaintiff could counter the
showing of newsworthiness by establishing that the private facts tort
serves a compelling state interest.
35
Before discussing these elements in greater detail, reasons supporting
the reformulation will be articulated. This reformulation is proposed for
the following reasons: First, it accords with the general treatment of
constitutional defenses because the defendant has to prove constitutional
129. This is not a change from existing law. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
130. The author recognizes that the value of newsworthiness as a balancing mechanism has been
extensively questioned. See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 553-554
(1970); Kalven, supra note 8; Zimmerman, supra note 8. However, it seems to be the test used by
lower courts to resolve the conflict between the private facts tort and the First Amendment. Thus, as
courts do not seem ready yet to abandon the doctrine, it seems useful to try to make the doctrine
more responsive to the concerns expressed in this article. Also, the advantage of using
newsworthiness is that it allows for a case-by-case determination of the issues rather than a blanket
rule. This will allow for a careful balancing of the interests presented in each case, which is a way to
ensure that the freedom of the press is not unnecessarily chilled.
131. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459
P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988),
cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989).
132. The second factor would not be adopted because courts have given it very little weight. See
Kapellas,459 P.2d 912; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
133. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43; Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922; 7imes Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556.
134. This nexus would be required regardless of plaintiff's status as a public or private figure. See
Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762. Contra Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. This is consistent with the approach adopted by the court in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989).
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privilege, rather than the plaintiff having to prove lack of privilege.
Second, this test will protect better the right to informational privacy
because it begins with the presumption that once disclosure is shown to
be tortious, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify its disclosure
under the First Amendment. The presumption in favor of privacy is
desirable because the interests at stake are critical to the maintenance of a
healthy pluralistic liberal democracy. Third, it still allows for a case-by-
case adjudication of the issues. By not establishing a categorical
prohibition on publication, courts are free to consider the interests at
stake based on each factual situation that arises.'36 Finally, it adds weight
to the second element of Florida Star test, which will help to protect
against courts giving too much weight to the lawfully obtained prong of
the test.
As to the "substantially related newsworthiness" factor, Prosser and
Keeton note that when a public disclosure of private facts is made, there
must be "some logical connection between the plaintiff and the matter of
public interest."' 37 Some courts have adopted a similar requirement when
a defendant is claiming that the matter published is of legitimate public
concern.'38 It is not enough to show that the general subject matter is one
of legitimate public concern-a defendant would have to show that the
specific information disclosed was substantially related to a matter of
legitimate public interest. In Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.," the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that:
- Because each member of our society at some time engages in an
activity that fairly could be characterized as a matter of legitimate public
concern, to permit that activity to open the door to the exposure of any
136. The Court in Florida Star evidenced a serious concern about the creation of categorical
prohibitions on the publication of truthfiul information: "We have previously noted the
impermissibility of categorical prohibitions upon media access where important First Amendment
interests are at stake. More individualized adjudication is no less indispensable where the State,
seeking to safeguard the anonymity of crime victims, sets its face against 3ublication of their
names." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539-40 (1989) (citation omitted).
137. Keeton, supra note 20, § 117, at 862.
138. Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. dnied, 493 U.S. 935
(1989); Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell, 614 F.2d at
397; Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762; Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Howard v.
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); see also Barrows v. Rozansky, 489 N.Y.S.2d 481,485 (App. Div. 1985) ("[T]o be privileged
such use must be legitimately related to the informational value of the publication and may not be a
mere disguised commercialization of a person's personality."); Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d
608, 613 (App. Div. 1983) ("Of course, there must have existed a legitimate connection between the
use of plaintiff's name and picture and the matter of public interest sought to be portrayed.").
139. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
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truthful secret about that person would render meaningless the tort of
public disclosure of private facts. The First Amendment does not require
such a result. Therefore, to properly balance freedom of the press against
the right of privacy, every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful,
newsworthy publication must have some substantial relevance to a matter
of legitimate public interest. 4 '
This limitation has been applied as well in connection with public
figures. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.'41 involved the public disclosure
by the defendant that plaintiff had undergone gender corrective surgery.
At the time of the publication, plaintiff was the student body president at
a community college.'42 The court had to decide whether her status as a
transsexual was newsworthy per se. 43 In assessing whether her sexual
status was within the scope of her waiver as a public figure, the court
sought a connection between Diaz's fitness for office and her sexual
status.'" It found none.'45 The court found first that her transsexuality did
not relate to her honesty or judgment. 146 Second, the court found that the
fact that Diaz was the first woman student body president did not
"warrant that her entire private life be open to public inspection."' 47 The
court emphasized that public persons waive their right to privacy as to
matters which are connected with their public conduct.' Thus, there
must be some nexus between the statements made and the public
agenda.49
Even if the defendant were able to show newsworthiness, the plaintiff
could argue that the protection of the information from publicity was
necessary for the furtherance of a compelling state interest. The case law is
still developing in this area so it is hard to state with any degree of certainty
what interests are compelling. The appellee in Florida Star argued that there
were three compelling interests protected by the state statute at issue: "the
privacy of victims of sexual offenses; the physical safety of such victims,
who may be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to their
140. Id. at 308.
141. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
142. Id. at 773.
143. Id. at 772.





149. See David A. Logan, Tort Lmv and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 493, 559 (1990).
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assailants; and the goal of encouraging victims of such crimes to report
these offenses without fear of exposure."15 The Court acknowledged that
the interests identified were highly significant.' Despite this
acknowledgment, the Court held that the statute at issue was not necessary
to protect those interests. 52 However, the Court was careful to limit its
ruling: "We accordingly do not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case,
imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might
be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the
Daily Mail standard."' 53 Thus, it appears that the interests specified in
Florida Star are compelling interests.
The California court in Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court'54 held
that the nondisclosure of a plaintiff's name served a compelling state
interest when a crime had been committed and the search for the
perpetrator was ongoing.'55 The plaintiff's roommate had been
murdered.'56 The plaintiff had discovered her roommate's body and had
seen the murderer.'57 The newspaper published an account of the murder
and identified the plaintiff by name. 58 The plaintiff then sued the
publisher of the Los Angeles Times for invasion of privacy. 59 In denying
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court held where
there is a witness to a crime and the criminal has not yet been
apprehended, "[t]he individual's safety and the state's interest in
conducting a criminal investigation may take precedence over the
public's right to know the name of 'he individual."' 60 It appears then that
the state's interest in an individual's safety and the resolution of crimes
are compelling state interests when the assailant is still at large.
150. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,537 (1989).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Under Daily Mail, the state has the burden of establishing that the imposition of sanctions is
necessary to serve a compelling interest. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979).
154. 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989).
155. Id. at 564.




160. Id. at 560; see also Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
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B. The Impact of Burden Shifting on the First Amendment
Under the proposed reformulation the disclosure of private
information would be protected only if the defendant were able to prove
that the specific information disclosed was obtained lawfully,
newsworthy, and substantially related to a matter of legitimate public
concern.' The major objection to the proposed model is that it will
unduly threaten First Amendment values. This fear is implicit in
decisions about the disclosure tort, the fear that punishing a media
defendant for publishing certain truthful information may lead to
"timidity and self-censorship."'
' 62
A review of each of the proposed changes and their relationship to
"First Amendment values" will reveal that these changes will not unduly
burden the First Amendment. 63 This proposed reformulation should
result in expansion of the privacy right. However, it will not threaten
First Amendment values. While an individual's interest in privacy may
be at stake, there are larger societal issues protected by privacy. These
societal values may be the same values protected by the First
Amendment. This section discusses the hidden First Amendment values
of privacy and illustrates that protecting the right of privacy does not
always undermine First Amendment values; indeed in some instances it
promotes them.
1. Newsworthiness as Defendant's Burden
Shifting the burden of proving newsworthiness to the defendant may
narrow the scope of protected First Amendment speech. There is a fear
that if media defendants have to justify publicizing certain information,
they may decide not to publish. This would chill some speech and create
an undesirable amount of self-censorship. This argument assumes that
disclosure always advances First Amendment values and that
nondisclosure does not. This assumption breaks down under close
161. This article does not address the issue of whether the question of newsworthiness should be
one of law or fact Shifting the burden of newsworthiness to the defendant should not have an impact
on this issue.
162. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989) (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469,496 (1975)).
163. This article will not discuss the effect of the lawfully obtained doctrine on the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court already has imposed this burden on the defendant. Thus, the
proposed reformulation does not alter the existing balance.
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scrutiny. The nondisclosure of private information can promote First
Amendment values as well as protecting individual privacy.
There are various competing theories of the First Amendment which
attempt to answer the question of what expression should be granted
protection and why. This article discusses three p:cominent First
Amendment theories: (1) the search for truth theory; (2) the self-
governance theory; and (3) the self-realization theory." 4
a. Non-disclosure and the Search for Truth
The search for truth is the first value that may be threatened by
placing the burden on the defendant to prove newswothiness.'65 The
164. The theories discussed here are clearly associated with freedom of speech. The issue arises
whether these theories are equally applicable when discussing freedom of the press. Is the freedom
of the press somehow distinct from the freedom of speech? If so, are there separate theories which
justify the free press guarantee? Scholars have long wrestled with these issues. See David Lange, The
Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 77 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hasting L.I. 639 (1975); Potter
Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 Hasting L.J. 631 (1975); William W. Van Alstyne, Interpretations of
the First Amendment (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court has resisted creating doctrinal differences
between the press and other speakers. Thus, it generally has endeavored to n.-ither advantage nor
disadvantage the press vis-h-vis other speakers. See Rodney A. Smolla, Smclla And Nimmer on
Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the First Amendment § 13.01[3] (1994). The exception to this
general rule is the concept of "reporter's privilege." This privilege does not relate to the thesis of this
article and thus, is irrelevant to the discussion. Generally, First Amendment theories and case law
subsume the protection of press under the protection of speech. See Van Alstyne, supra, at 50-5 I.
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart has argued that the press has a special insttutional role to play:
that it operates as a check on the three branches of government. Stewart, supra, at 634. Under this
theory the protection extended the institutionalized press is designed to check the abuse of official
power. Others have argued that the role played by the press is as agent for the public; that it is a
conduit of information to the people. For an ectensive discussion of this theory, its strengths and
weaknesses, see Van Alstyne, supra, at 50-67. See also James J. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 Hasting L.J. 777,
793 (1975). Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the concept of press as either a checking agent or as
a conduit of information, it does not render the three theories discussed in this article inapplicable.
Indeed the concept ties in well with both the marketplace and the self-goverrance theories of the
First Amendment. See Nimmer, supra, at 653. In discussing the three theories of the First
Amendment, then, the discussion includes both the guarantees of free speech and free press.
165. It is helpful to keep in mind that although the First Amendment safaguards the right to
disseminate information, this right does not always take precedence over the tight to privacy. The
interests must be balanced against one another, with the outcome dependent upon the specific facts
of individual cases. Chafee discusses the need for this kind of careful analysis of interests:
IT]here are individual interests and social interests, which must be balanced against each other,
if they conflict, in order to determine which interest shall be sacrificed under the circumstances
and which shall be protected and become the foundation of a legal right. It must never be
forgotten that the balancing cannot be properly done unless all the interests involved are
adequately ascertained ....
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search for truth is often identified as the most prominent principle
justifying freedom of expression.'66 This principle posits that freedom of
expression is necessary because it leads to the discovery of truth. The
open exchange of ideas, the freedom to challenge positions articulated,
the freedom to criticize, all without fear of reprisal, encourages the
emergence of truth. 67
Several influential American jurists have adopted the "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor in interpreting the First Amendment, and have ensured
its prominent place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Included are
Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Hand. 6 Holmes's articulation of the
justification is often cited:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition
by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as
when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
Zechariah Chafee Jr., Free Speech in the United States 32 (1942) (citation omitted).
166. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 15 (1982).
167. Two philosophers are closely associated with this principle of freedom of expression: John
Milton and John Stuart Mill. Milton argued persuasively for this principle of free expression:
[T]hough all the winde[s] of doctrin[e] were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the
field, we do injuriously by licen[s]ing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and
Fals[e]hood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the wors[e], in a free and open encounter?
John Milton, Areopagitica. A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to
the Parliament of England 35 (England, Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., Ltd. 1927) (1644).
Mill, in On Liberty, echoes the defense raised by Milton. Mill argues in his essay:
[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who
desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority
to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of
judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume
their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty . ... There is the greatest difference
between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it
has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation.
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which
justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with
human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 24,27-28 (Gateway ed., Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1859).
168. For the Holmesian view, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Brandeis expressed his view in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-
78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Frankfurter's view is articulated in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 546-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); and Hand expressed his view in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Int'l Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950), a/'d, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
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care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at
any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. 69
The search for truth is served by limiting the number cf restrictions on
the press. However, that is not the only way the value can be served. The
search for truth is served as well by people becoming informed on a
given topic, and engaging in public discourse. Granting people privacy,
recognizing that despite their entering into the public debate on an issue
that they remain a private person to some degree, encourages people to
come forward and engage in the debate."0
Numerous articles have shown that the intense scrutiny to which the
press subjects people has had a chilling effect on those who would seek
public office.'7 1 These articles indicate that people have declined to
169. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes's articulaion of the search for
truth theory of the First Amendment is but one of many. Professor Frederick Schauer has
extrapolated three common characteristics shared by the various articulation. of this theory. First,
this theory views freedom of speech as a means, a process for ascertaining truth, rather than an end.
Schauer, supra note 166, at 16. Second, the marketplace theory assumes that tiuth will prevail in the
competition between it and falsehood. Id. Third, the theory is skeptical aboul accepted beliefs and
widely acknowledged truth. Id.
170. Gavison states:
[l]t can be argued that respect for privacy will help a society attract talented individuals to
public life. Persons interested in government service must consider the loss of virtually all
claims and expectations of privacy in calculating the costs of running for public office. Respect
for privacy might reduce those costs.
Gavison, supra note 17, at 456.
171. On this point, Professor Robert Bellah argues that:
[T]here is also reason to consider whether the treatment of public figures by the media does not
have a "chilling effect" on the decision of individuals to enter the public sphere because they
fear what the relentless scrutiny may do to them. To the extent that such fear deters able people
from public service, this is a cost that a democratic society can ill afford.
Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 743, 746 (1986);
see also Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, .i7 Alb. L. Rev. 1061
(1994); Thomas S. Axworthy, Politics and Privacy, Maclean's, May 18, 1987, at 34; Paul Johnson,
A World Without Leaders, Commentary, July 1994, at 19; Al Kamen, For Two, Much Adieu About
Something, Wash. Post, May 26, 1993, at A17; Steve Kukolla, Jefferson for President: Blue Ribbon
Panelists Look for an Alternative, Indianapolis Bus. J., May 4, 1992, at I; George Skelton, Running
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become involved in politics or have withdrawn from political life due to
the intense media scrutiny of both their public and private lives. The
same chilling effect may discourage others from speaking out on public
issues.72
We are better off as a nation if we can motivate the public to learn
about issues and to engage in meaningful dialogue concerning them. This
engagement promotes the search for truth, and encourages an informed
rather than an ignorant public. If granting people privacy, meaning not
publicizing information that a publisher is not certain is newsworthy,
encourages this participation in public debate, then privacy promotes the
First Amendment value of truth.
Professor Lee Bollinger explores this concept of the role of the press
in stifling the public discussion. In his book Images of a Free Press he
suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to place
restrictions on the press, particularly in the areas of libel and privacy, has
a negative impact on society in general. "' He argues that since the
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,74 the central image
of the press is that of governmental watchdog. 75 Pursuant to this image,
the government is prohibited by the First Amendment from punishing or
censoring the press.'76 The government cannot be trusted to regulate
public debate, as its self-interest will lead it to impose undue restrictions
on speech and on the press.'77 The public, not the government, is the
ultimate sovereign-unlimited debate is necessary for the public
benefit.'78 The press is the public's representative "helping stand guard
against the atavistic tendencies of the state and serving as a forum for
public discussion."'79
Bollinger takes issue with this principle of freedom of the press. One
criticism of this principle is that it does not adequately value the social
From, Not for, Office, L.A. Times, July 23, 1990, Metro Desk, at Al; Alexander B. Trowbridge,
Attracting the Best to Washington, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar/Apr. 1985, at 174.
172. The blacklisting of members of the entertainment industry in the 1950s provides an example
of what can happen if people are deprived of privacy concerning political beliefs. Due to the close
scrutiny given individuals, and the invasions of privacy, the political activities of writers, directors
and actors were seriously curtailed.
173. Lee Bollinger, Images of a Free Press 24-27 (1991).
174. Id. at 2 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).






interests at stake in a contest with the First Amendment. 8 Bollinger uses
the areas of libel and privacy as examples to support his argument that
the Court undervalues the private costs of unrestricted press speech. The
Court's analyses in Florida Star and Cox Broadcasting offer examples of
the Court's undervaluing the privacy interests at stake in these two cases.
In discussing the Court's conclusion that the names of the rape victims
were already made public, Bollinger argues:
[A] Court sensitive to the privacy costs involved surely would have
noted that to a normal person there is a great difference between
having a humiliating and embarrassing fact recorded in a transcript
housed at the local courthouse and having it become th. headline of
the local newspaper or television station.' 8 '
Bollinger also suggests that there are other concerns that the Court
fails to consider. 2 He posits that the Court has cast the harm done by an
unfettered press as a private harm; only the person libeled or whose
privacy has been breached is injured. Bollinger cautions that there is a
larger social cost to be paid where the press is too unrestricted.'83 Again
using the examples of libel and privacy, he argues that to limit the
discussion of interests to the individual interest at stake is "to ignore the
relevance of other strong social concerns about the quality of public
discussion."'84 He argues, as does this article, that one of the costs of an
autonomous press is that "press freedom might, instead of enhancing
public discussion and decision making, actually prove to be a threat to
it-a threat to quality decision making, a threat to democracy, a threat to
the very values the First Amendment (as defined by New York Times v.
Sullivan and its successors) is supposed to further."' 85
Bollinger contends that a free press may repress rather than enhance
public discussion and decision making and "can exclude important points
of view, operating as a bottleneck in the marketplace of ideas."' 86
Without the law of defamation as a recourse, people would have to bear
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id. at26.
182. In later sections of his book Bollinger discusses why the Court may have been reluctant to
limit the autonomy of the press and suggests that the press may not be as autonomous as the central
image implies. Id. at 62-84.
183. Id. at 34-35.
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the weight of libelous falsehoods. Some would not want to bear this
burden, opting instead not to participate in public life.
8 7
An analogous argument can be made as to privacy. One way in which
the press represses rather than enhances public discussion is by
discouraging people from expressing points of view, thus restraining
public debate.' 8 As previously stated, a recent example of this
discouragement is Colin Powell's decision not to run for the United
States presidency. One reason apparently supporting his decision not to
run was that "Powell decided his family was more important to him than
the presidency. Their privacy could not be 'sacrificed' to the rigors of the
race."'8 9 Using privacy as a strong check on the power of the press may
encourage participation in public affairs. If a publisher decides not to
publicize information that is marginally newsworthy, the search for truth
can be enhanced by that nondisclosure if it encourages rather than
discourages public participation and the expression of opinions and
ideas.
b. Self-Governance
Self-governance is the second First Amendment value that is arguably
threatened by requiring the defendant to prove newsworthiness. The
concern is that shifting the burden of proof to defendant may discourage
the publicizing of information that would be helpful to a self-governing
people. This would impinge on the First Amendment value of self-
governance.
The self-governance theory of the First Amendment is premised on
the belief that free expression is necessary for the proper functioning of
democracy. 9' It holds that "the essential objective of the First
187. Id. at 36.
188. See id. at 25, 35-36.
189. Family or Country?, The New Republic, Nov. 27, 1995, at 7,7.
190. Free expression is said to contribute to the proper finctioning of a democracy in a number of
ways:
(1) It controls abuses of power by government officials. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521.
(2) It facilitates majority rule. Smolla, supra note 164, § 2.04[2][b].
(3) It allows citizens to participate in decision-making. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591,601-04 (1982).
(4) It allows citizens access to information necessary to formulate opinions and make decisions.
See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 3-89
(1960).
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Amendment is to promote a rich and valuable public debate."' 9' This
theory is most closely associated with Alexander Meiklejohn, its chief
contemporary architect and advocate. 9 Meiklejohn begins with the
rejection of the marketplace of ideas metaphor. He substitutes a town
meeting metaphor. 93 The town meeting metaphor illustrates his primary
assumption that the people in a democracy are sovereign.'94 To govern
effectively, citizens must be fully informed-they must have unlimited
access to material relevant to the decisions they are required to make.
Restrictions on the information available to the sovereign people would
impede the deliberative process and thus lead to the malfunctioning of
the democracy. 95
A principle that is related to the sovereignty of the people is that
government officials are servants rather than rulers.' It is their
responsibility to respond to the demands of the people as sovereign.
Thus, the right to speak and communicate is necessary to enable citizens
to communicate their wishes to those officials.' 97 The self-governance
theory taken to its extreme leads to the conclusion that only political
speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection,'98 or that political
speech is at least entitled to more protection than nonpolitical speech.' 99
(5) It protects the right of the minority to dissent from majority decisions, thus creating the
appearance of fairness and encouraging stability. See Emerson, supra note 130; Smolla, supra note
164, § 2.0412][e].
191. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and te Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1109 (1993).
192. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 24; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245. For a brief summary of those espousing a self-governance theory
of free expression prior to Meiklejohn, see Chafee, supra note 165; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 255 (1992).
193. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 24. His metaphor has been the subject of criticism. See Post,
supra note 191.
194. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 18-19. Meiklejohn is clearly not the originator of the idea of
the people as sovereign theory; this theory was articulated early in this nation's history by James
Madison who stated that "In the United States ... [t]he People, not the Government, possess the
absolute sovereignty." James Madison, Report on the Resolutions (House of Delegates, Session of
1799-1800), in 6 The Writings ofJames Madison 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
195. Meiklejohn, supra note 190, at 26; Schauer, supra note 166, at 38.
196. Schauer, supra note 166, at 38.
197. Id. at 38-39.
198. Other scholars have written supporting this narrow interpretation of the First Amendment.
See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
199. See Sunstein, supra note 192, at 301.
The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy
As expressed by Professor Owen Fiss, the degree of protection that
should be afforded speech should depend on whether it promotes a rich
public debate:
On the whole does it [the contested speech] enrich public debate?
Speech is protected when (and only when) it does, and precisely
because it does, not because it is an exercise of autonomy. In fact,
autonomy adds nothing and if need be, might have to be sacrificed,
to make certain that public debate is sufficiently rich to permit true
collective self-determination.00
Whether political speech alone is entitled to First Amendment
protection or is entitled to the highest degree of protection, both reflect
the belief that political speech lies at the core of the First Amendment.
The theory that the First Amendment is designed fundamentally to
protect democratic self-governance 201 has had a substantial impact on
First Amendment jurisprudence. 2 The Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan 3 underscored the relationship between democracy and freedom
of speech and press. The Court ruled in New York Times that a public
official could not bring an action for libel absent a showing of actual
malice, which was defined as knowledge of or reckless disregard for the
falsity of the statements at issue.2" In reaching its decision the Court
stated that the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people. ' '20 ' To further underscore the point the Court
quoted from its earlier opinion in Stromberg v. California:206
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
200. Fiss, supra note 192, at 1411.
201. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 263.
202. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985); Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).
203. 376 U.S. 254.
204. Id. at 280, 283.
205. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
206. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.0 7
In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,0 8 the Court reaffirmed
its position that speech which contributes to public discourse should be
given heightened First Amendment protection.2 9 The Court was faced
with the question of whether a private plaintiff had to show actual malice
to recover damages for libel when the defamatory statements did not
involve an issue of public concern.10 In holding that the plaintiff did not
have to make such a showing the Court reasoned, "'We have long
recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It
is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection.' 21 ' The Court found that speech about a
private individual that does not involve a matter of public concern is
entitled to less First Amendment protection.12 This is consistent with the
theory that the essential objective of the First Amendment is to ensure
robust public debate. 3
Yet protecting privacy by not disclosing private information also has
political value. As noted by Professor Emerson, "a system of privacy is
vital to the working of the democratic process. 21 4 Professor Edward
Bloustein also discusses the political value of privacy:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among
others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification
is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality
and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass. His
opinions, being public, tend never to be different; his aspirations,
being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; his
feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique
personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a
being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual.1 5
207. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369).
208. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
209. Id. at 758-59.
210. Id. at 761.
211. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
212. Id. at 759.
213. While it has recognized the primacy of political speech, the Supreme Court has not gone so
far as to hold that the First Amendment protects only political speech. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
214. Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
215. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 1003.
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Studies support the comments of Professor Bloustein. The studies
indicate that the threat of continued exposure to adverse public opinion
curtails an individual's willingness not only to voice dissenting or
nonconformist opinions but also curtails the willingness to entertain such
positions privately. 216 To be healthy, a democratic, pluralistic society
requires the participation of its members. Privacy encourages that
participation, and enhances its quality, by allowing individuals the space
within which to formulate their individual thoughts and opinions. 27 The
ability to formulate thoughts and opinions in private encourages
independence of thought, unconventionality, and a willingness to reject
conformity. Privacy allows people to question conventional wisdom and
to seek their own answers. If people are allowed privacy they are more
likely to make valuable contributions to the public debate by questioning
the status quo, first privately, then publicly. We are committed to a
society that encourages pluralism and independent judgment. We expect
individuals to bring those independent judgments to bear in the political
arena. Thus, privacy is necessary to actualize our vision of ourselves as a
211
nation.
Bollinger's argument concerning the need for a check on the press in
order to promote the search for truth is equally applicable here. It is
desirable for people to engage in public discourse not only because it
aids in the search for truth, but also because it aids democracy by
enriching the public debate. Shifting the burden of newsworthiness to the
defendant may cause a publisher not to publish marginally newsworthy
information. However, that decision not to publish may encourage
people to contribute to the debate on matters of public concern, thus
promoting democratic deliberation.
c. Autonomy: Self-Realization and Individuality
Autonomy is the third interest that might be threatened by shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant. Again the concern is that the burden of
proof may discourage publicizing information infringing on the First
216. See S.E. Aseh, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in Groups, Leadership and Men 177, 181 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951); see also Knud
S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical Comparisons, 5 J. Soc.
Behav. & Personality 163 (1990); Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 2 Handbook
of Soc. Psychol. 347 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985); Nigel Nicholson et al.,
Conformity in the Asch Situation: A Comparison Between Contemporary British and U.S. University
Students, 24 British J. Soc. Psychol. 59 (1985).
217. See Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
218. See Gavison, supra note 17, at 455-56.
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Amendment value of autonomy. A number of First Amendment scholars
have identified autonomy as a core First Amendment value.219 First
Amendment theory based on this interest focuses on the relationship
between the individual and the First Amendment. Unlike the prior two
theories, this theory assumes that the First Amendment serves interests of
individuals that are intrinsically, rather than instrumentally, valuable.
Thus, it protects individual interests not because to do so will promote
societal values, such as truth or the proper functioning of a democracy.
Rather it protects those interests because they are inherently good. 0 The
individual interests protected by autonomy have been identified as self-
realization and individuality.'l
1) Self-Realization
This theory posits that an underlying premise of the First Amendment
is the assurance of individual self-realization. 2 If a publisher decided
not to publish marginally newsworthy information because of the
concern that he could not meet the burden of proving newsworthiness,
the argument is that this First Amendment value woitd be harmed
because it would limit the self-realization of those who would receive the
information.
Individual self-realization can encompass both the development of
powers and abilities and the ability to make choices which result in the
realization of individual goals.'z To be fully human, the minds of
humans must be free.224 A fully realized human is inherently valuable.
Schauer articulates the underlying concept as follows:
This conception ... is derived from ideas of personal gr-owth, self-
fulfillment, and development of the rational faculties .... If it is the
power of reason that distinguishes man from other forms of animal
life, then only by fully exploiting this power can one be said to
enjoy a full life. Because the basis of this conception of the full life
is complete use and development of the mind and thinking process,
219. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 'JCLA L. Rev. 964
(1977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 875 (1994); Post, supra
note 191; Redish, supra note 190; David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334 (1991).
220. Schauer, supra note 166, at 47.
221. Id. at48.
222. For a fuller exposition of this theory, see Redish, supra 190.
223. Id. at 593.
224. See Emerson, supra note 130, at 546.
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speech is said to be an integral component of self-fulfillment, the
one being inseparable from the other. Free speech is thus said to be
justified not because it provides a benefit to society, but because it
is a primary good.22
Under this theory, then, speech is protected because it is necessarily
and inevitably tied to thought, reason, imagination and creativity.226 It
protects that which makes us distinctly human. 7 This theory of the First
Amendment takes into account both the rights of the speaker and the
listener. Both benefit from communication generated in the attempt to
develop both rational and creative, emotional faculties."2
There has been some judicial acceptance of the theory that the
individual's interests in self-expression is a First Amendment concern.229
In Procunier v. Martinez,'20 the Court was faced with the issue whether
regulations censoring the mail of prisoners violated the First
Amendment. The Court invalidated the regulations, and Justice Marshall
in concurrence argued eloquently that:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but
also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-
expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development
of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject
the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's
worth and dignity. . . . [A] prisoner needs a medium for self-
expression. It is the role of the First Amendment and this Court to
protect those precious personal rights by which we satisfy such
basic yearnings of the human spirit.
231
Sometimes this interest in autonomy is not addressed expressly;
rather, the concept of autonomy underlies the Court's opinions. For
instance, in West Virginia v. Barnette,22 the Court was faced with the
225. Schauer, supra note 166, at 49-50.
226. See Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54, 80 (1989).
227. See Smolla, supra note 164, § 2.03[2][c].
228. See Solum, supra note 226, at 80.
229. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 n.2 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 n.12 (1978); id. at 783, 804-06; (White, J., dissenting); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396,418 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971).
230. 416 U.S. 396.
231. Id. at 427-28 (citation omitted) (Marshall, J., concurring).
232. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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issue whether a public school board could compel students to salute the
American flag. 3 In holding that such compulsion violated the First
Amendment the Court stated "[w]e think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge [of allegiance]
transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. 234
This language, while it never uses the words autonomy or self-
fulfillment, evidences a concern for autonomy values.
2) Individuality
The argument for a free speech principle based on the protection of
individuality suggests that the primary interest protected is individual
autonomy. 3 This theory is best articulated by Thomas Scanlon.236 Under
this theory free speech is premised on the inviolability of ihe principle of
individual choice. The individual is to be granted absolute sovereignty in
the process of making choices. This concept of autonomy is described by
Professor Richard Fallon as ascriptive autonomy.237 Ascriptive autonomy
is based on the notion that individuals have the right to make self-
regarding decisions; it "marks a moral right to personal sovereignty.""
To fully enjoy this sovereignty, the individual should be as fully
informed as he desires to be. Thus, there should be no restrictions on his
access to material necessary to exercise his autonomy and to make
"intelligent choices." 239 If placing the burden of newswol.-thiness on the
defendant causes a publisher not to publish, this may negatively affect
the autonomy of listeners by depriving them of information necessary to
make intelligent choices. Scanlon's concept of autortomy, that is,
freedom from governmental interference, be it coercive, manipulative or
233. Id. at 624.
234. Id. at 642.
235. Schauer, supra note 166, at 67-72 (making arguments from divertity and dignity as
justifying freedom of speech and acknowledging that autonomy agreement is one that is most
persuasive).
236. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204 (1971). But
see T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 519,
530-37 (1979). For an alternative articulation of the theory, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978).
237. Fallon, supra note 219, at 877.
238. Id. at 878.
239. Schauer, supra note 166, at 69.
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distortive, has been defined as negative descriptive autonomy.40 As
articulated by Schauer:
[N]o government has the authority to distort the individual's
ultimate choice by preventing him from hearing any argument
solely because it is on one side of an issue rather than another...
Scanlon's theory, therefore, is best characterized not as a right to
speech, but rather as a right to receive information and, more
importantly, a right to be free from governmental intrusion into the
ultimate process of individual choice.24'
Respect for individual choice and personal sovereignty is reflected in
Supreme Court decisions.242 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Branzburg v.
Hayes," recognized the relationship between the First Amendment and
autonomy: "the press enhance[s] personal self-fulfillment by providing
the people with the widest possible range of fact and opinion." 2' In
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,245 the Court stated that, "at the
heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be
free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should
be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the
State."246 These decisions indicate an acceptance on the part of some
prominent jurists of autonomy as a First Amendment value.
The notion that the First Amendment protects the right to receive
information is clearly reflected in the Court's decisions concerning
commercial speech. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,247 the Court declared invalid a Virginia
statute that subjected pharmacists to license suspension or revocation if
they advertised the price of prescription drugs. The Court reasoned that
the First Amendment protected the free flow of information and that
consumers had an established interest in receiving the information
published by pharmacists: "As to the particular consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not
240. Fallon, supra note 219, at 875.
241. Schauer, supra note 166, at 69.
242. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42
(1943).
243. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
244. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
245. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
246. Id. at 234-35.
247. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate. 248 This interest in the listener's right to receive information is
reflected in a number of other Supreme Court decisions.249
3) Privacy and Autonomy
Autonomy, however, is not the exclusive province of the First
Amendment. If a central concern is individual autonomy, the sovereign
right to make choices, then this interest can be protected by privacy and
perhaps harmed by too broad a reading of the First Aaendment. As
discussed above, one sense of autonomy includes personal sovereignty. It
includes the right to make choices about one's life. A publisher's
decision not to publish marginally newsworthy deeply private facts about
an individual promotes that individual's autonomy. The disclosure of
private facts may offend the principle of autonomy because it violates the
individual's right to choose who shall be privy to such information. This
violation of dignity occurs regardless of the public reaction to or interest
in the information disclosed. It matters not whether the public is repulsed
or sympathetic; the harm is that one's dignity has been affi-onted and his
private life has been forcibly subjected to public scrutiny.25°
Privacy also advances self-realization, which is another aspect of
autonomy. As discussed above, self-realization includes the development
of all human faculties. It also includes the development of morals and
values upon which opinions are based. While the First Amendment
values and protects self-realization, privacy creates the conditions under
which self-realization can occur:
[I]t is in privacy that we are able to develop the resources necessary
to be morally autonomous, persons whose moral values are
genuinely our own. Without the opportunity to develop moral
values in our private lives, we would have little opportunity to go
beyond the values embodied in the formal roles we play and in the
expectations of those we relate to through them. Moreover, the
likelihood is far greater that we would be unable to make
judgments other than those required by the conventions of our
positions. The capacity to develop a moral point of view which is
248. Id. at 763.
249. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
250. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 979.
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authentically our own requires the opportunity for reflection,
discussion and action, within the sphere of private life.2 '
The point here is that the right to privacy and the First Amendment both
serve the same interest in individual autonomy. In a sense, there is a
symbiotic relationship between privacy and the First Amendment. With
privacy, people are able to develop themselves. Part of that development
includes the formation of values, morals and opinions. Often, this
development occurs in response to information that the First Amendment
makes available. Having formed opinions, people often desire to express
themselves. The First Amendment then protects that expression. Because
both are critical to autonomy, it is desirable to give proper weight to both.
2. Burden Shifting and Defamation
The immediately preceding section demonstrates that shifting the
burden of newsworthiness to the defendant does not unduly burden the
First Amendment. Further, it contends that privacy can promote First
Amendment values. However, in addition to concern about unduly
burdening the First Amendment, there may be a concern that shifting the
burden of proof as to newsworthiness to the defendant would be
inconsistent with the allocation of burdens made under the law of
defamation." 2 Some courts have turned to the law of defamation to try to
decide how to balance the rights of privacy against the First
Amendment. 3 In allocating the burden of proving newsworthiness to the
plaintiff, the California court in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune justified its
decision by arguing that it was mirroring the allocations made in the law
of defamation." 4 This objection assumes that constitutional privileges as
to privacy should be similar to those for defamation because the two torts
both protect the individual interest in human dignity and personality.
The constitutional privileges in defamation are intricate; some might
even call them convoluted. 5 There appear to be four different categories
251. Robert S. Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the
Protection of Private Life, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 385, 422 (1982).
252. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Reptr. 762, 768-70 (Ct. App. 1983).
253. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d. 1122 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762.
254. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
255. See Lyrissa Bamett-Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the Myth of Community, 71 Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1996).
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of libel law. 6 The level of First Amendment protection that will be
granted libelous speech depends both on the status of the plaintiff and on
whether the matter is one of public concern. The first category of
libelous speech involves speech about public figures on matters of public
concern. The standards applicable to this category of speech were
determined by the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 5 7 Pursuant
to New York Times and its progeny,258 public figures seeking to recover
for defamation can only do so by overcoming the First Amendment
privilege. To overcome the privilege, the public figure must show that
the defendant spoke with actual malice, which is defined. as knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.259 The plaintiff must show
actual malice as well to recover for punitive and presumed damages.
The second level of libelous speech involves public figures and
matters not of public concern. It is not clear what the plaintiff s burden of
proof is here or what standard of liability for damages would apply. The
Court has not yet resolved this question.
The third category of libelous speech involves a private person and
matters of public concern.26 The standard here evolves from the Court's
decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.26 In Gertz the Court held that a
private person plaintiff in a defamation action did not have to show actual
malice to recover262 Instead, the Court held that with private individuals,
the states were free to establish any standard of liability s'o long as they
did not impose liability without fault.263 Actual malice was still
necessary, however, to recover for punitive or presumed damages.2"
256. These four categories are: (I) speech about public figures on matters or public concern; (2)
speech involving public figures and matters not of legitimate public concern; (3) speech involving
private persons and matters of public concern; and (4) speech involving private persons and matters
not of legitimate public concern.
257. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
258. New York Times applied only to public officials. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
However, the Court extended the rule to all public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967).
259. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
260. While in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Couit moved away from
considering the public nature of the speech, its subsequent decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), indicates that a different test is applicable when the
speech involves matters not of public concern.
261. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
262. Id. at 343-47.
263. Id. at 347.
264. Id.at 350-51.
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The fourth category includes speech about a private person where the
speech is on a matter not of public concern. In its most recent case on
this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court held that with this category of speech,
states may permit awards of presumed and punitive damages absent a
showing of actual malice.265 It is not yet clear whether this category of
libelous speech still requires the plaintiff to show some level fault
pursuant to Gertz.266
This recounting of constitutional privileges in the law of defamation
reflects the complex state of the law. The complexity of the rules is just
one several reasons why reliance on the law of defamation would be
misplaced.267 First, the very complexity of the law threatens to have a
chilling effect on speech. A publisher must wind his way through the
various categories and guess into which category the speech falls. As
argued by one commentator:
By making so unpredictable the legal consequences of speech, the
Court has encouraged excessive self-censorship among some
speakers, reckless mudslinging among others, and has raised the
prospect of due process challenges by speakers unable to conform
their conduct to law.268
Applying the constitutional scheme for defamation to the area of
privacy would create the same confusion and self-censorship that
currently exists as to defamation. Rather than eliminate uncertainty, it
would create it. While the newsworthiness test already may create some
uncertainty, that uncertainty pales compared to the thicket surrounding
the law of defamation.
Second, the allocation of burdens made in the law of defamation is
predicated on the values protected by the tort of defamation and by the
First Amendment. The value protected by defamation is an individual's
interest in her reputation. The First Amendment values protected can
265. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985).
266. This last development has led to the issue of whether newsworthiness remains a viable
defense at all. The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Cox and Florida Star can be construed as a
rejection of the newsworthiness test in favor of the lawfully obtained doctrine. However, state and
lower federal courts are construing these cases narrowly and have not yet abandoned the
newsworthiness test. The curtain has not yet fallen on the newsworthiness defense to privacy actions.
267. Several articles have been written that address this precise topic. For a more extensive
discussion of this issue see Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, and its Relation to the Law of
Libel, 39 Am. L. Rev. 37 (1905); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied To Privacy, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935 (1968);
Woito, supra note 37, at 203-217.
268. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 217 (1985).
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include the search for truth, self-governance, and any number of other
values. In essence, individual rights are being weighed against societal
rights. With privacy, on the other hand, the interest protected is not
merely the interest in one's dignity, but rather the interests in the search
for truth, autonomy and self-governance. Because the values being
served by the plaintiffs privacy action are First Amendment values
rather than simply human dignity, it is inappropriate to adopt the
defamation model.
Third, the law governing the private facts tort has never relied on the
status of the plaintiff to alter the elements of the prima facie case.269
There is no precedent in the law of privacy, then, for imposing
defamation's plaintiff-speaker scheme onto privacy. Fourth, the
newsworthiness doctrine already takes into account the status of the
plaintiff7 if the information revealed concerns a public figure, courts
consistently find that the matter published is newsworthy.27 ' Indeed, one
of the factors used in California to decide newsworthiness is the extent to
which the individual voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety.72 Because the newsworthiness test already accounts for the
status of the plaintiff there is again no need to adopt the defamation
model.
Fifth, the rationale offered by Gertz for applying different fault
standards based on the status of the plaintiff is inapplicable to the
disclosure tort. 273 Pursuant to the Court's ruling in Gertz, private citizens
are more deserving of protection than public figures because private
citizens have less access to the media to rebut a defamatory falsehood.274
Accepting that public figures do indeed have easier access to the media,
this access is meaningless in the privacy context. Defamation by
definition involves falsity; thus the ability to rebut publicly the statement
made is valuable because it cures some or all of the harm inflicted. The
269. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 867 (1934); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D.
270. See Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, Et 210.
271. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940);
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 126 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1954), rev'd, 229 F.2d
481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969);
Smith v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). But see Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
272. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Kapehas, 459 P.2d at 912;
Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App. 1987).
273. Nimmer, supra note 267, at 961; Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 212.
274. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
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publication of the truth restores the victim's reputation, which is the
interest harmed by defamation.
The disclosure of private information, however, is not analogous to
defamation. The interest protected by privacy is not reputation. In the
privacy context there is no curative or corrective speech. Unlimited
media access will do nothing to cure the harm inflicted by the unwanted
disclosure. Indeed, more publicity is precisely what the plaintiff does not
want. Thus, the rationale underlying the defamation distinction is
inapplicable to privacy.
Finally, there is an argument that because courts have applied the
"actual malice" standard to claims of false light privacy, the defamation
standard should be applied to the private facts tort as well.275 Application
of the defamation standards to privacy began with the leading false light
privacy case of Time, Inc. v. Hill.276 In Time, the plaintiff, James Hill,
sued defendant based the publication of an article in Life Magazine
describing the opening of a Broadway play.277 The play was based on the
actual kidnapping of the James Hill family by escaped convicts. The Life
article implied that the play recreated the actual events of the
kidnapping.278 In fact, it did not.279 The gist of plaintiffs complaint was
that the article portrayed him in a false light.28" The Court held that where
the information falsely reported involved matters of public interest, the
plaintiff could not recover absent a showing that the defendant had
published the information with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth.28' Since Time, courts have applied the actual
275. This argument is reviewed in detail by Woito & McNulty, supra note 39, at 213-17, and by
Nimmer, supra note 267, at 962. For an opposing argument see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable
Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267.
276. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
277. Id. at 377.
278. Id. at 379.
279. Id. at 378.
280. Id. at 377.
281. Id. at 387-88. The law of defamation has evolved since Time, Inc. v. Hill was decided.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(holding that private figures need only show that defendant was negligent as to truth or falsity of
information published), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (holding that when speech concerns private person on matter not of public concern presumed
and punitive damages may be awarded without showing of actual malice). Prior to Gertz, it was
unclear whether private figures had to show actual malice or simple negligence. The question arises
whether a private individual bringing a false-light privacy cause of action must still prove actual
malice or whether the lesser standards adopted in Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet apply.
Courts take differing approaches to this question. For decisions applying the lesser standards see
Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984); Wood v. Hustler
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malice defamation test to false-light privacy actions involving public
figures.
282
Application of the defamation standards to the false light privacy tort,
however, does not mean that they should be applied to the private facts
tort. One argument against applying the malice standard to the private
facts tort is that it is more appropriate to apply defamation standards to
the false light privacy tort because both torts are based on falsity.283 The
two are more analogous than are the private facts tort and defamation.284
Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (19:35); Lerman v. Flynt
Distrib. Co, 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Fils-Aime v.
Enlightenment Press, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Term. 1986).
For decisions finding that actual malice should be the standard see Fellows v. National Enquirer,
Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986); Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 607 N.F.2d 201 (111. 1992);
Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (III. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 922 (II1.), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989); Colbert v. World Publishing Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987).
282. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Elder, supra note 33,
§ 4:12, at 330 nn.28 & 29 (1991). The Second Restatement of Torts has incorporated the actual
malice standard into its definition of the false light tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D
(1977).
283. Section 652E of the Second Restatement of Torts defines the false light tort:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in
a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensi;e to a reasonable
person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
The comment to this section states that "it is essential to the rule stated in this section that the
matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. a
(1977).
Section 558 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the elements of e cause of action for
defamation:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another,
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the e:cistence of special
harm caused by the publication.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
284. The U.S. Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill, seemed to limit it,. application of the
defamation standards to the false light tort: ".... revelations were so intimate and so unwarranted in
view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency." Time, 385 U.S. at
383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940)).
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The interests protected by the false light tort and defamation are similar;
both protect the individual's interest in her reputation.28 Unlike the false
light tort, the private facts tort by definition involves the disclosure of
true information. As argued above, the interest protected by the private
facts tort differ from this interest in reputation.286 Because the private
facts tort and the false-light tort redress different harms, the
constitutional limits on false light privacy should not be imposed on the
private facts tort.
Second, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill did not seem ready to extend
the actual evidence standard to preclude recovery for the publication of
truthful information where the disclosure involved "'[r]evelations... so
intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to
outrage the community's notions of decency'. ... This case presents no
question whether truthful publication of such matter could be
constitutionally proscribed."287 To date, the Court has maintained this
position that the First Amendment does not always protect truthful
publication,288 and has declined to apply the defamation standards of
liability to the publicizing of truthful information.
3. The Nexus Requirement
The foregoing sections addressed two major objections to shifting the
burden of proving newsworthiness to the defendant. This section reviews
the effect the substantially related factor might have on the First
Amendment. As discussed above, the reformulated test would require
that there be a substantial relationship between the specific information
disclosed and a matter of legitimate public concern. The First
Amendment privilege is not absolute.2 89 To require that the defendant
show that there is a substantial relationship between the information
285. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) ("'[T]he
interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of
reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation."') (citation omitted).
286. An argument has been made that the defamation privileges should not apply to the private
facts tort because they should not have been applied to false light privacy either. This argument
rejects the position that the interests protected by defamation and false light privacy are the same.
The argument holds that application of malice to the false light tort at all was wrong because it was
premised on the illusion that the torts of defamation and false light are similar. For a full explication
of this argument see Nimmer, supra note 267, at 962-67.
287. Time, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809).
288. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469,491 (1975).
289. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524, 532.
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disclosed and a matter of legitimate concern simply forces a reasonable
fit between disclosure and a First Amendment value. If there is no
relationship between the disclosure and a First Amendment value, then
the information should not be protected by the First Amendment.
Without this limitation, any private information that the media
discovers could be published. This would essentially eliminate the
private facts tort. Such a result is not compelled by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court itself has stated that the First Amendment does not
protect all truthful disclosures,29 thus indicating an intention not to
eliminate the private facts tort. Indeed, there is no Supreme Court
precedent that is directly controlling as all of the cases that have come
before the Court have involved the disclosure of information that had
been made public. It has not yet squarely faced the conflict between the
First Amendment and private information that has not been made public.
A majority of courts continue to believe that the private facts tort is
viable,29' and decisions after Florida Star constru.e its holding
narrowly.292 All of this indicates an intention not to eliminate the private
facts tort, although it is clearly limited by the First Amendment privilege.
IV. THE REFORMULATED TEST AND THE DISCLOSURE OF
MEDICAL INFORMATION
Thus far this article has reviewed existing approaches 1o balancing the
protection of private information against the First Amendment. It has
offered a reformulated approach to this balancing and addressed some
possible objections to the revised approach. This section applies the test
to the protection of private medical reformation. The reformulated test
discussed in the preceding sections of this article proposes that: (1) the
burden of proving newsworthiness should fall on the delendant, not the
plaintiff claiming invasion of privacy; (2) the defendant must show that
the information disclosed is substantially relevant to a matter of
legitimate public concern; and (3) the plaintiff should be able to rebut the
defendant's newsworthiness argument by showing that the restriction-
here, the private facts tort-is necessary for the furtherance of a
compelling state interest. This section applies this test to the disclosure of
290. Id. at 524.
291. See Libel Defense Resource Center, supra note 8.
292. See discussion supra part II.B.I and notes accompanying text.
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deeply private medical information. Specifically, it uses as an illustration
the disclosure that Alma Powell is taking medication for depression.293
,4. Invasion of Privacy
First, Mrs. Powell would need to show (1) the publicizing, (2) of
private information, (3) which publicity would be highly offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
1. Publicity
As discussed above in part II, publicity requires dissemination of
information to the public at large. The information must have been
communicated to a substantial number of people. When a member of the
mass media disseminates information, the publicity requirement is
satisfied.294  Members of the media are "quintessential public
disseminators. 295 In the case of Alma Powell, both Newsweek and the
Philadelphia Inquirer caried the story about her medical condition.296
This broad dissemination of information would satisfy the publicity
requirement.
2. Private Facts
The next element a plaintiff such as Mrs. Powell would need to satisfy
would be that the information disclosed was private. The information
disclosed about Powell was confidential medical information. Medical
information disclosed in confidence is quintessentially, inherently
private. Several early cases recognizing the tort of invasion of privacy
involved the unauthorized publicizing of medical information.297 In
293. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
294. See Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987); Harris v. Easton
Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). See generally Elder, supra note 33,
§ 3:3, at 157 n.77.
295. Elder, supra note 33, § 3:3, at 154.
296. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
297. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930); Banks v. King Features
Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (relief granted for unauthorized publication of x-rays of
woman's pelvic region); Feeney v. Young, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1920); Griffin v. Medical
Soc'y, I I N.Y.S.2d 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (unauthorized photograph of a plaintiff's deformed
nose published in medical journal); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (C.P. 1940)
(unauthorized use of photographs of patient's facial disfigurement). For a case involving the privacy
of medical procedures that predates the Warren and Brandeis article, see De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W.
146 (Mich. 1881) (court recognized privacy when man intruded on woman giving birth).
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Barber v. Time, Inc.,298 the Missouri court was faced squarely with the
issue whether defendant's publication of plaintiff's picture was protected
by the First Amendment or impermissibly violated plaintiff's privacy.
The plaintiff was suffering from a disease that caused her to eat
excessively while simultaneously losing weight rapidly. Without the
plaintiffs consent, the defendant magazine published an article naming
plaintiff along with a photograph taken while she was in the hospital
receiving treatment for her condition. In ruling in plaintiff's favor, the
court argued:
Certainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the
right to obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an
individual personal condition ...without personal publicity....
Whatever the limits of the right of privacy may be, it seems clear
that it must include the right to have information given to or gained
by a physician in the treatment of an individual's personal ailment
kept from publication which would state his name in connection
therewith without such person's consent.299
The court in its opinion recognized the First Amendment values at
stake, but reasoned that the two interests could be accommodated. It
stated that where the subject matter of the article was of legitimate public
interest, the First Amendment would protect its publication. Short of that,
the right of privacy was to prevail." 0
Barber has been followed by a number of jurisdictions. °' The court in
the more recent case of Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's,3O2 relies heavily on
Barber v. Time, Inc. The plaintiff in Vassiliades sued her physician and
two department stores for invasion of privacy.30 3 The physician, a plastic
surgeon, had used photographs of the plaintiff in a presentation about
298. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
299. Id. at 295.
300. The court was mindful of the potential abuse of its rights by the press:
[F]reedom of the press was not created merely for the benefit of the press, but because it is
essential to the preservation of free government and progress of civilization... Therefore, the
press, like individual citizens, must not abuse its constitutional rights or overlook its obligations
to others.
Id.
301. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985); Y.G. i,. Jewish Hosp. 795
S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Some have questioned the reasoning and logic of the decision and
consider it poor precedent. See Pember, supra note 9, at 132-34.
302. 492 A.2d 580.
303. Id. at 584.
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plastic surgery made at two department stores.3° Plaintiff asserted that
she had not consented to such use by the surgeon, and sued for invasion
of privacy.3 5 The court held that the surgeon had violated plaintiff's
privacy by publicizing the photographs.3"' The court regarded the
publication of the photographs as the publication of private medical
information. The court found that the right to privacy at the very least
includes the right to keep private medical information.30 7
In Y. G. v. Jewish Hospital,03 the plaintiffs alleged that defendants had
violated their right to privacy by televising plaintiffs attending a hospital
function commemorating the success of the hospital's in vitro
fertilization (IVF) program.30 9 The plaintiffs had participated in the IVF
program and were expecting triplets when they appeared on television.3 l0
In agreeing that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for invasion of
privacy, the court found that the plaintiffs' participation in the program
was a private matter. The court reasoned that IVF concerned matters of
procreation, sexual relations and medical treatment, all of which are
private matters. 31' This court reaffirmed the general notion illustrated by
Barber that medical information is a private, not a public matter.
The California courts have held clearly and specifically that the right
of privacy guaranteed by the California constitution includes the right to
keep private information pertaining to a person's medical history,
treatment, or condition.3"2 In discussing the relationship between medical
information and the right of privacy, the California courts have stated,
"[a] person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more
intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already
judicially recognized and protected. 3 3 In a leading case on the issue of
the constitutional protection of medical records, the California court
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 590.
307. Id. at 587.
308. 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
309. Id. at 488.
310. Id. at 492.
311. Id. at 500.
312. Binder v. Superior Court, 242 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1987); Wood v. Superior Court, 212
Cal. Rptr. 811, 819-20 (Ct. App. 1985); Jones v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 154-55 (Ct.
App. 1981) (constitutionalized right to privacy protects details of citizen's medical history); Board of
Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60-61 (Ct. App. 1979).
313. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
Washington Law Review
discusses the reasons we guard so closely the privacy of medical
information:
The matters disclosed to the physician arise in most sensitive areas
often difficult to reveal even to the doctor. Their unauthorized
disclosure can provoke more than just simple humiliation in a
fragile personality. . . . The individual's right to privacy
encompasses not only the state of his mind, but also his viscera,
detailed comilaints of physical ills, and their emotional overtones.
The state of a person's gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to
privacy from unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is
that person's bank account, the contents of his library or his
membership in the NAACP. We conclude the specie of privacy
here sought to be invaded [the unconsented to disclosure of patients
medical records] falls squarely within the protected anbit [of the
California constitutional right of privacy].3" 4
In Alma Powell's situation, based o n the existing precedent, she
would have a strong argument that the fact that she was taking
medication for depression constituted a private fact. It was information
concerning medical treatment she was receiving. While the nature of the
information disclosed about Mrs. Powell is private, it may have become
public depending on the number of people who knew about her
condition. Courts generally have held that disclosure to a limited number
of people will not render private information public. However, General
Powell stated during his press conference that he and his wife had told
many people about Mrs. Powell's condition.315 A court would have to
decide whether the information had become public due to the number of
people who knew of Mrs. Powell's condition.
3. Offensive Nature of Information Disclosed
The final element which a plaintiff such as Mrs. Powell would have to
establish is the disclosure was offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities. The dissemination of certain medical information will
satisfy this standard.316 Courts have found that the publication of the
314. Id. at 61.
315. Excerpts From Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2, at Al4.
316. The disclosure of some confidential medical information will not satisfy this element of the
tort; for instance if one were to disclose the information shared with an interrist concerning the
symptoms associated with sinusitis, headache, stuffy nose, or earache, it is doubtful that such
disclosure would be offensive.
734
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following information was offensive: the unauthorized publication of a
nude photograph of a person; 7 the disclosure by an employer to fellow
employees that plaintiff had had a mastectom?'i8 or hysterectomy;3"9 the
showing of a surreptitiously made videotape of plaintiff engaged in
sexual intercourse; 2 and the disclosure that plaintiff has tested HIV
positive.32" ' HIV-positive status, syphilis and other sexually transmitted
diseases are medical facts which if disclosed might be offensive.
Alma Powell was being treated for depression. Depression is another
kind of medical condition to which stigma is attached.3" Depression is a
condition which people strive to keep secret or private. Disclosure that
one is suffering from the condition can be not only offensive but
humiliating. Mrs. Powell would have a credible case for arguing that the
disclosure was offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
B. Defendant's Burden of Proof
Once Mrs. Powell had made her prima facie case, the media
defendants who publicized Powell's medical condition would have the
burden of proving that the information disclosed was lawfully obtained
and newsworthy. To determine newsworthiness under the reformulated
test, consideration would be given to the following: (1) the social value
of the facts published; (2) the extent to which the party voluntarily
317. Gallon v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
318. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
319. Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990).
320. Boyles v. Kerr, 806 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 855 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. 1993).
321. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Hillman v. Columbia County,
474 N.W.2d 913 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1991).
322. Courts have recognized and acknowledged that stigma attaches to one who is identified as
mentally ill. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,492 (1980) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-
26 (1979)); In re Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979). In Roulet, the court noted:
In the ideal society, the mentally ill would be the subjects of understanding and compassion
rather than ignorance and aversion. But that enlightened view, unfortunately, does not yet
prevail. The stigma borne by the mentally ill has frequently been identified in the literature: "a
former mental patient may suffer from the social opprobrium which attaches to treatment for
mental illness and which have more severe consequences than do the formally imposed
disabilities. Many people have an 'irrational fear of the mentally ill.' The former mentally ill
person is likely to be treated with distrust and even loathing; he may be socially ostracized ....
The legal and social consequences of commitment constitute the stigma of mental illness, a
stigma that could be as socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction.
Id. (citations omitted).
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acceded to position of notoriety; and (3) the relationship between the
information disclosed and a matter of legitimate public concern.
1. Social Value of Facts Published
In asking about the social value of the facts published, we are in a
sense asking about First Amendment values. What values were served by
the publicizing of Mrs. Powell's medical condition? Argmnents could be
made that the disclosure served the values of self-governance and the
search for truth.
a. Self-governance
The media defendant could argue that the publicity served the value of
self-governance. The argument would be that Mrs. Powell is married to a
man whom many thought was contemplating running for the office of
President. Because Colin Powell was a potential candidate for public
office, so the argument goes, the public needed the information about his
wife to assess General Powell's character and ability to serve. The
defendant could argue further that the public needed information about
Mrs. Powell because it needed to assess her character as well. Given the
amount of influence that spouses of politicians may have, the
information enabled citizens to better evaluate the Powells as the
potential First Family. Eleanor Roosevelt, Nancy Reagan and Hillary
Rodham Clinton all have played an important and influential role as First
Lady. Additionally, it could be argued that publicizing the information
increased public awareness of and public education about depression. It
may have prompted people to seek advice about and treatment of the
disease.
b. The Search for Truth
The media defendant might assert that the dissemination of
information contributed to the robust exchange of ideas, thus aiding in
the search for truth. As with the self-governance argument, the notion is
that the information is valuable because it adds to the discourse about
depression specifically and mental illness generally. The idea is that the
more information that is contributed to the debate, the more likely it is
that the truth about the topic will surface.
The topic at issue here is that of depression. The media defendant
could argue that publicizing the information about Mrs. Powell helped
Vol 71:683, 1996
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destigmatize mental illness and thus aided in uncovering the truth about
it. This argument is based on the notion that publicizing the fact that an
influential person has an illness which is stigmatized helps to eliminate
the stigma. It helps to eliminate myths about the illness and those who
suffer from it. Thus, the disclosure aided the search for truth. At least one
court has been amenable to the destigmatization argument. In Sipple v.
Chronicle Publishing Co. 323 the plaintiff filed suit claiming invasion of
privacy based on the defendant newspaper's disclosure that plaintiff was
homosexual.2 4 Sipple, a private citizen, foiled Sara Moore's attempt to
assassinate President Gerald Ford.325 Two days after the attempted
assassination, the San Francisco Chronicle published an article
concerning Sipple, in which it disclosed that he was a prominent member
of the San Francisco gay community. In ruling against Sipple, the
California court held that the facts disclosed were newsworthy and that
their publication served "legitimate political considerations, 326 including
the destruction of stereotypes about homosexual men as being "timid,
weak and unheroic.'' 3 Arguably, the publicizing of Mrs. Powell's
condition served to destigmatize the disease of depression.
2. Voluntary Public Figure
The third factor to consider when deciding whether information is
newsworthy is the degree to which the person voluntarily acceded to a
position of public notoriety. Mrs. Powell has not injected herself into the
limelight. She kept a low profile when her husband was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. She has not taken political positions; she has not
come forward in any respect. Aside from her marriage to Colin Powell,
she has maintained her private person status. The degree to which she has
kept herself private would militate towards finding that the information
published was not newsworthy.
3. Nexus Requirement
The reformulated approach would add a fourth consideration in
assessing newsworthiness: whether the information disclosed is
substantially related to a legitimate matter of public concern. If the
323. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
324. Id. at 667.
325. Id. at 666.
326. Id. at 670.
327. Id.
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matter of public concern is construed as Colin Powell's potential
candidacy, the question becomes whether Mrs. Powell's medical
condition was substantially related to General Powell's candidacy. This
situation is similar to the plaintiffs situation in Diaz.328 There, the issue
was whether plaintiffs transsexuality was substantially related to her
ability to serve as student body president of a college. The California
court found that her transsexuality bore little, if any, relalionship to her
honesty, integrity or ability to serve.3 29
Here, there is little connection between Mrs. Powell's condition and
General Powell's fitness for office. First, assuming that the information
was necessary for people to assess the character of a political candidate,
it did not pertain to Colin Powell, the potential candidate. That his wife
was taking medication for depression does not speak to Colin Powell's
fitness for office, nor does it reflect on his governing abilities, his
honesty, his integrity, or his judgment. As noted in the editorial quoted at
the beginning of this article,330 the information might be relevant if Mrs.
Powell were not taking medication which she needed to treat her
condition. That was not the case. Moreover, General Powell was not yet
a candidate when the disclosure was made. To say that there is a First
Amendment interest in the private lines of potential candidates leads to
the conclusion that there is a First Amendment interest in every citizen's
life. Every citizen is a potential candidate for office. This result construes
the First Amendment too broadly and unduly trammels the right to
privacy.
C. Plaintiff's Rebuttal
Mrs. Powell could rebut the newsworthiness argument by showing
that the private facts tort serves a compelling state interest. Mrs. Powell
could argue that the tort promotes self-governance, autonomy and the
search for truth. It is arguable that these interests are compelling as they
are protected by the First Amendment. She would then have to show that
the private facts tort is narrowly tailored to further those interests.
328. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
329. Id.
330. Rosenthal, supra note 5.
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1. Compelling State Interests
a. Self-Governance
Mrs. Powell could show that protection of the information is needed to
serve the compelling state interest in self-governance. Perhaps by the
disclosure of Mrs. Powell's condition some citizens learned that even
well-situated people can suffer from depression. This can serve the goals
of self-governance. But if the social value served by the story was to
increase public awareness of the disease, the articles fell short of this
goal. As the court stated in Diaz, "The tenor of the article was by no
means an attempt to enlighten the public on a contemporary social
issue.... The social utility of the information must be viewed in context,
and not based upon some arguably meritorious and unintended
purpose."33' Simply identifying a sufferer of a disease without providing
supporting information about it does nothing to increase public
awareness.
Moreover, even if the intention is to educate the public about a
disease, it may not be necessary to violate the privacy of person suffering
from the condition by identifying him. This point was made strongly in
Barber v. Time, Inc.,332 where the court stated that, "[ilt was not
necessary to state plaintiff's name in order to give medical information to
the public as to the symptoms, nature, causes or results of her ailment." '333
A similar finding was made by the court in Lambert v. Dow Chemical
Co.,"' where the court found that while showing in safety lectures of
photo of gaping wound in plaintiff's leg was a legitimate use, there was
no need to identify plaintiff by name.335
331. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr, at 773.
332. 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
333. Id. at 295.
334. 215 So. 2d 673 (La. Ct. App..1968).
335. Id. at 675; see also Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988),
cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1931); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960
(1970); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d
819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Edward J. Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 Rutgers L.J. 41, 58-61
(1974); James R. Beattie, Jr., Note, Privacy in the First Amendment: Private Facts and the Zone of
Deliberation, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 899, 913 (1991). But see Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d
1222, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271,274 (5th Cir.
1989) (use of rape victim's name necessary to establish credibility of accused claim of innocence),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct.
App. 1988); Barbieri v. News-Joumal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); Macon Tele. Publishing Co. v.
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Finally, if self-governance was the social value served by the
disclosure, General Powell's comments concerning his decision not to
run for office support the position that nondisclosure would better have
served the goal of self-governance. General Powell implied that his
decision not to run for office was based at least partially on his concern
about the invasion of his family's privacy.336 The fear of an unrestricted
press may have discouraged a viable person from running for office.
General Powell arguably would have been a viable candidate For office.
If elected, he would have been this nation's first African-American
President. Our nation may have suffered a considerable loss when
General Powell declined to run for office. This social value was
undermined by the publicity, rather than enhanced.
b. Autonomy
Mrs. Powell could argue that protecting the information about her
condition served the state interest in personal autonomy. Autonomy
would allow her to choose whom would be privy to such personal
information. The disclosure of private information about an individual
violates that individual's right to autonomy. It removes from that
individual the right to choose who shall have access to personal private
information about herself and thus violates the principle of personal
sovereignty.
c. Search for Truth
Mrs. Powell could argue that the private facts tort is necessary to
further the state interest in truth. First, Mrs. Powell would argue that the
search for truth is enhanced by confidentiality particularly when medical
issues are involved. It is critical that people confide in their physicians
completely and without reservation. If Mrs. Powell had known that her
treatment for depression would become public information, she might
not have sought treatment. Individuals need to confide not only for their
own health, but for the health of the community. Eradication and
treatment of disease is facilitated by conducting studies and experiments.
Confidentiality encourages participation in such studies and experimental
Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. 1993); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d
289, 302-03 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
336. See Excerpts From Colin L. Powell's News Conference, supra note 2.
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treatments. Many would not participate in these studies and experiments
without the guaranty of privacy and confidentiality.337
Second, Mrs. Powell could rebut the destigmatization argument. The
destigmatization argument assumes that prejudice is born of ignorance. It
assumes further that with more information about the subject of
prejudice, truth will surface and the prejudice will be eliminated. These
assumptions are questionable. Schauer offers a critique of the theory that
truth will prevail over falsity, or that knowledge will prevail over
ignorance.338 He argues that the theory is based on the assumption that
people are rational and capable of objective reasoning.339 Thus, the
destigmatization argument assumes that prejudice is rational. As history
teaches, this is an insupportable assumption. To argue that truth will out
over ignorance, it must be shown "either that true statements have some
intrinsic property that allows their truth to be universally apparent, or
that empirical evidence supports the belief that truth will prevail when
matched against falsehood.""34 Neither of these has been shown to be the
case.
While the assumptions underlying the destigmatization argument are
uncertain, the harm caused by the disclosure of private information is
not. It is clear that that which was held private deliberately has become
public, creating a loss of human dignity. The disclosure can engender
feelings of humiliation and embarrassment. The harm done to the
individual seems disproportionate to the tenuous good to the public that
may result from the disclosure.
Finally, as argued above in connection with self-governance, because
of the threat to his family's privacy we have lost the contributions to
public discourse that Colin Powell may have made both as presidential
candidate and president. We have suffered a loss because we are unable
to hear his thoughts, ideas and opinions on issues that we face as a
nation. The marketplace would have been better with these ideas.
337. See Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (1lth Cir. 1985)
(affirming district court order denying defendant access to names and addresses of participants in
medical study on Toxic Shock Syndrome).
338. Schauer, supra note 166, at 25-30.
339. Id. at 25-26.
340. Id. at 26.
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2. Narrowly Tailored Restriction
After establishing that the private facts tort serves the compelling state
interests of self-governance, autonomy and the search for truth, Mrs. Powell
would have to establish that the tort was narrowly tailored to further those
interests. The concern again is that the restriction must not unduly burden
the First Amendment.
The private facts tort provides a civil damages remedy for the disclosure
of deeply private facts. The issue becomes whether such EL civil remedy is
the least burdensome remedy available to a plaintiff. This article considers
five alternative remedies to discern whether this is the least restrictive
measure available: (1) criminal sanctions; (2) injunction; (3) retraction; (4)
right of reply; and (5) governmental controls over the release of information.
Both criminal sanctions for the disclosure of deeply private facts and an
injunction which would restrain the publication of the infbrmation would
impose heavier burdens on the First Amendment than the existing civil
remedy. Generally, criminal sanctions create more of a chilling effect than
do civil sanctions. People are more concerned about being convicted of a
crime, and risking a prison sentence than they are about hav:ng to pay a civil
fine. The loss of liberty is a frightening prospect as is that of having a
criminal record.
Prior restraints are more burdensome than civil penalties and are
disfavored by courts.34' As the Supreme Court has stated, any "'system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."'342 Judicial disfavor of
prior restraints is based on the fact that suppression occurs before the
information is disseminated. The Supreme Court has indicated that
punishment after publication is preferred to prior suppression:
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of
speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others
beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an
individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate
speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling
censorship are formidable.343
341. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
342. New York i"mes, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963)).
343. Southeastem Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
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With an injunction, the court decides that the information will not be
published. With the private facts tort, the decision to publish is left in the
hands of the media defendant. The option for publishing remains. Thus,
more speech will be published under the private facts tort than if the remedy
were an injunction. Because an injunction would suppress speech prior to
dissemination it would be more burdensome on the First Amendment than
the civil damages remedy.
The harm that occurs when deeply private facts are disclosed cannot be
remedied by either retraction or right of reply. These remedies are feasible
when information disclosed is false. In this context, where the information
disclosed is true, such remedies are meaningless. Once the true private
information is publicized, a retraction is useless. Similarly, there is no reply
to be made to the disclosure. The information is true. There is no record to
set straight.
A final remedy is suggested by the Court in Florida Star.3" There, the
state statute imposed civil sanctions on members of the mass media for
printing, publishing or broadcasting the name of the victim of a sexual
offense.345 The plaintiff's name had been obtained from a police report which
inadvertently had been placed in a pressroom accessible by the public.346
The Court held that the statute was not necessary to safeguard the
compelling state interests identified.347 The Court suggested that there were
more limited means of guarding against the release of the name of sexual
assault victim where the government was responsible for the initial
disclosure of information.348
The Court's rationale in Florida Star is inapplicable here. The
information about Mrs. Powell was not released by a government actor.
Thus, the possibility of tighter internal controls on the release of private
information is not a viable option. None of the five alternatives would be
less burdensome than the civil remedy provided by the private facts tort.
Thus, in this case, the tort would seem necessary to serve the compelling
state interests of self-governance, autonomy, and the search for truth.
344. 491 U.S. 524.
345. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,526 (1989).
346. Id. at 528.
347. Id. at 541.
348. Id. at 538. The Court suggested that the police department should tighten its internal policies to
prevent the inadvertent disclosure of the names of rape victims. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Allowing the right to privacy to preempt the First Amendment may
not be as harmful to First Amendment values as has been suggested by
some courts. Indeed, recognizing the privacy rights of individuals may
promote, rather than undermine those values. Recognizing the privacy
interests at stake allows us to retain our autonomy, our dignity and
facilitates this experiment called democracy.
